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OCTOBER TERM, 1973 
No. 
THE MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING OOMP ANY, 
a division of 
KNIGHT' NEWSPAPERS, INC., 
Appellant, 
v. 
PAT L. TORNILLO, JR., 
Appellee. 
On Appe,al from the Supreme Court of Florida 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Appellant The Miami Herald Publishing Company, a 
division of Knight Newspapers, Inc. ("The Miami Herald") 
appeals from the judgment of the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida entered on July 18, 1973, rehearing denied October 10, 
1973, which reversed a decision of the Circuit Court of 
2 
Dade County, Florida and upheld the constitutionality of 
Section 104.38, Florida Statutes. This Jurisdictional State-
ment is submitted to show that the Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction of this Appeal and that substantial constitu-
tional questions are presented which merit review by this 
Court. 
OPINION BELOW 
The initial opinion of the Florida Supreme Court 
dated July 18, 1973 and the opinion denying rehearing 
dated October 10, 1973 are not yet reported. The opinion 
of the Circuit Court of Dade County is reported at 38 
Fla. '8upp. 80 (1973). Copies of these three opinions are 
included in the Appendix to this Statement. 
JURISDICTION 
This action was brought by Appellee Pat L. Tornillo, 
Jr. ("Tornillo") against The Miami Herald for a manda-
tory injunction directing The Miami Herald to print 
verbatim a statement by Appellee and for damages based 
upon an alleged violation of Section 104.38, Florida Stat-
utes, a criminal statute. On October 20, 1972, the Circuit 
Court for Dade County dismissed the Complaint, holding 
Section 104.38, Florida Statutes, to be in violation of the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, and Article I of the Florida Constitution. 
Tornillo appealed directly to the Florida Supreme Court 
on November 3, 1972, and that Court reversed the decision 
of the Circuit Court and upheld the constitutionality of 
Section 104.38, Florida Statutes, in an opinion dated 
July 18, 1973. The Miami Herald filed a Petition for 
Rehearing, which was denied by the Supreme Court of 
Florida on October 10, 1973. The Miami Herald filed a 
Notice of Appeal on : 
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Notice of Appeal on November 1, 1973. A copy of the Notice 
of Appeal is included in the Appendix to this 'Statement. 
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States 
to review this decision by direct appeal is conferred by 
Title 28, U.S.C., Section 1257 (2). Although the Supreme 
Court of Florida remanded this case to the trial court for 
further proceedings, the opinion and judgment of the 
Florida Supreme Court are final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 
§1257 (2). The Florida Supreme Court conclusively decided 
the controlling constitutional issue, and its decision, which 
is binding upon the trial court, is therefore reviewable by 
this Court. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966); Hudson 
Distributors v. Lilly & Co., 377 U.S. 386 (1964); Mercan-
tile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 (1963). 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Does Section 104.38, Florida Statutes, abridge freedom 
of the press and due process of law in violation of the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution by compelling a newspaper to provide free 
space, under criminal sanctions, to a candidate in any state 
election to reply to any publication in the newspaper which 
"assails [his] personal character," or charges him with 
"malfeasance or misfeasance" in office, or "otherwise 
attacks his official record"? 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion provides, in part: 
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press. . . ." 
4 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides, in part: 
" ... No State shall ... deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law .... " 
The principal statute involved in this case is Section 
104.38, Florida Statutes, which is part of the Florida 
Election Code: 
"§104.38 Newspaper assailing candidate in an 
election; space for reply. -If any newspaper in 
its columns assails the personal character of any 
candidate for nomination or for election in any 
election, or charges said candidate with malfeas-
ance or misfeasance in office, or otherwise attacks 
his official record, or gives to another free space 
for such purpose, such newspaper shall upon re-
quest of such candidate immediately publish free 
of cost any reply he may make thereto in as con-
spicuous a place and in the same kind of type as 
the matter that calls for such reply, provided 
such reply does not take up more space than the 
matter replied to. Any person or firm failing to 
comply with the provisions of this section shall 
be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, 
punishable as provided in §775.082 or §775.083." 
Sections 775.082 (5) and (6) and 775.083, which 
provide criminal sanctions for violations of §104.38, Fla. 
Stat., are reproduced in the Appendix to this State-
ment, together with Sections 97.021 (1)- (4) and (18), 
which define the terms "election" and "candidate", as used 
in Section 104.38. No other terms contained in Section 
104.38 are defined in the Florida Election Code. 
" ,, 
5 
Section 770.02, Fla. Stat., is a retraction statute wl 
limits a plaintiff in a libel action to actual damages wh 
upon plaintiff's request, the publisher of the alleged def 
atory statement prints a retraction. This Statute is 
in the Appendix to this Statement. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In the fall of 1972, Tornillo was a candidate for 
Democratic Party nomination for a seat in the Flo:r 
House of Representatives. On September 20, 1972 and S 
tember 29, 1972, The Miami Herald published editori 
relating to Tornillo's candidacy. Copies of these editori 
appear in the Appendix to this Statement. 
On September 30, 1972, Tornillo requested The Mia 
Herald to print verbatim and free of cost a statement s1 
mitted by Tornillo, purportedly in reply to the editori 
pursuant to Section 104.38, Florida Statutes. The Mia 
Herald did not print the material submitted by Tornil 
Tornillo did not request a retraction pursuant to §770.( 
Fla. Stat., or otherwise claim that the editorials were lib 
ous, untrue, or inaccurate. 
On October 1, 1972, Tornillo filed a civil action 
the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit seeki1 
to require The Miami Herald to publish his "reply," and 
obtain damages. Circuit Judge Francis J. Christie held ~ 
emergency hearing on the matter on October 2, 1972. Tl 
Attorney General was notified of the suit pursuant 
§86.091, Fla. Stat., requiring notice of any action in whi< 
a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional, and was repr 
sented at the hearing. 
6 
At the hearing, the Court was advised that the Attor-
V General had refused to appeal a decision by Volusia 
unty Judge J. Robert Durden which had held §104.38 
constitutional, because the Attorney General himself had 
:ervations about the constitutionality of the statute. 
at case, State v. News-Journal, 36 Fla. Supp. 164 (Volu-
County, Fla., Judges Ct. 1972) was apparently the 
st case brought under §104.38 since its enactment in 
L3. A copy of the opinion in that case is contained in the 
pendix to this Statement. The Attorney General advised 
lge Christie that his opinion was unchanged since the 
ws-Journal case, and that he continued to have doubts 
the constitutionality of §104.38, and therefore would 
defend the statute. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Christie or-
·ed Tornillo's case dismissed with prejudice, holding the 
tute void on its face as an impermissible restriction upon 
edom of speech and press in violation of the First and 
1rteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
.tes and, in addition, denied due process of law under 
Fourteenth Amendment because of its vagueness and 
biguity. 
Tornillo appealed the judgment of the Circuit Court 
:!ctly to the Supreme Court of Florida. The Attorney 
1eral of Florida filed a brief urging affirmance of the 
cuit Court's decision. Amicus curiae briefs urging affir-
nce of the Circuit Court's judgment were also filed by 
American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Inc. and 
1es Publishing Company, publisher of two daily news-
ers, the St. Petersburg Times and the St. Petersburg 
ependent. Donald U. Sessions, an attorney acting on his 




On July 10, 1973, the Supreme Court of Florida 
rendered an Opinion, per curiam, which reversed the Cir-
cuit Court and upheld the validity of §104.38, Fla. Stat., 
finding that the statute did not violate the Constitutions 
of the United States or of Florida. One Justice dissented. 
On August 2, 1973, The Miami Herald filed a Petition 
for Rehearing. Twenty-two Florida newspaper publishers 
filed amicus .£!!riae briefs urging the Court to grant the 
Petition and reverse its initial decision. The Attorney / ) 
General of Florida filed a second Brief advancing similar 
views. 
The Petition for Rehearing was denied in a per curiam 
opinion dated October 10, 1973, one Justice again dissent-
ing. On November 1, 1973, The Miami Herald filed a 
Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of the United 
States. 
THE QUESTIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL 
Introduction 
This appeal involves the constitutionality of a novel 
form of governmental regulation of the press which is 
ostensibly designed to promote fairness in elections, but 
which in fact represents a severe restraint upon the exer-
-cise of journalistic discretion by putting the government in 
the editor's chair. In essence, the Florida statute in question 
conditions a newspaper's right to print editorials, news 
stories, advertising, or any other matter bearing unfavor-
ably upon political candidates by requiring that such 
matter is printed, the newspaper must offer the 
8 ' 
candidates free space for a "reply." Violations of the stat-
ute are punishable as misdemeanors of the first degree. 
The Florida Supreme Court has also held that the statute 
may be invoked as the basis for a private action for man-
datory injunction and damages. 
The issues presented by this case have fundamental 
and far-reaching implications. Tornillo has asserted that 
the Florida statute is not only consistent with the First 
Amendment, but essential to providing him and others sim-
ilarly situated with a means of publicly expressing their 
political views. Tornillo has sought to bring himself within 
the ambit of the Federal Communications Act's fairness 
doctrine and the personal attack rules of the Federal Com-
munications Commission, urging that these doctrines can 
and should be applied to newspapers. 
By contrast, The Miami Herald's position below and 
before this Court is that the "right of reply" statute 
represents an abridgement of a basic and vital constitu-
tional protection provided to the press by the First Amend-
ment. By its terms, the statute imposes governmental con-
trols on editorial decisions to publish critical stories about 
political candidates. Such controls directly threaten jour-
nalistic integrity and weaken freedom of expression. The 
per curiam decision of the Supreme Court of Florida up-
holding the reply statute is thus in fundamental and irrec-
oncilable conflict with the principles underlying this 
Court's decision in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. 
Democratic National Committee, __ U.S. __ , 36 
L.Ed.2d 772 (1973) and the decisions of other courts. 
Governmental regulation of the content of newspapers by 
requiring publication, in the absence of compelling state 
' ,. 9 
interests, is no less an unconstitutional restraint than 
governmental prohibition upon publication. The attempted 
analogy between newspapers and telecommunications media, 
if upheld, would eradicate the long recognized distinction 
between permissible regulation of print media and the 
electronic media. Censorship of newspapers in the guise of 
promoting fairness by requiring a right of "reply" or 
"access" is, nevertheless, censorship. As such, it is the 
exact opposite of the freedom of speech and press guar-
anteed by the First Amendment. 
Even assuming that a State might legislate some form 
of access to the press without violating the guarantees of 
freedom of expression provided in the First Amendment, 
the Florida criminal statute at issue in this case is incon-
sistent both with the First Amendment guarantees of a 
free press and the due process rights in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, because the statute is excessively broad, 
vague, and ambiguous. The Florida Supreme Court at-
tempted to cure some of the more obvious constitutional 
defects in the statute through interpretation, but the effort 
simply revealed more clearly the vices of the statute. 
A. The Florida Statute which Requires Requir-
ing the Press to Publish a Reply as a Condi-
tion to Publishing Matter Critical of Political 
Candidates Violates the First Amendment 
1. The Decision below is in conflict with the rationale 
of prior cas.es. 
This Court has never ruled directly upon a 
statute requiring newspaper publication of a "reply."' 
·-.... 
10 
fundamental question is whether the editorial discretion 
of newspapers may be constitutionally circumscribed by 
governmental regulation which compels publication. In 
Columbia Broadcasting System, this Court held that a 
broadcaster may not be forced to accept paid political ad-
vertising, concluding that governmental intrusion upon the 
exercise of "journalistic discretion" to determine what 
should or should not be published contravenes the "rigid 
limitations" of the First Amendment. Similarly, other fed-
eral courts, including three Circuit Courts of Appeal, have 
uniformly rejected any notion that the First Amendment 
permits the adoption of governmental regulation which 
compels a newspaper to publish material against its will. 
The arguments advanced by Tornillo in the proceed-
ings below were essentially similar to those made and 
rejected in Chicago Joint Board, Amal. Cloth. Workers v. 
Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970). In 
that case, the newspaper-ret"used to publish advertisements 
submitted to it by the union, which presented the union's 
views on a labor dispute in which it was engaged. 
"It is urged that the privilege of First Amendment 
protection afforded a newspaper carries with it 
a reciprocal obligation to serve as a public forum, 
and if a newspaper accepts any editorial adver-
tising it must publish all lawful editorial adver-
tisements tendered to it for publication at its es-
tablished rates. We do not understand this to be 
the concept of freedom of the press recognized in 
the First Amendment. The First Amendment 
guarantees of free expression, oral or printed, 
exist for all ... The Union's right to free speech 
' 11 
" 
does not give it the right to make use of the de-
fendants' printing presses and distribution sys-
tems without defendants' consent." ld. at 478. 
The union's petition for certiorari was denied. 402 U.S. 
973 (1971). 
The constitutional issues involved in an attempt to 
compel a newspaper to publish were also squarely faced 
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Associates & 
Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 
1971). In that case, a movie distributor claimed that its 
First Amendment rights were violated by the newspaper's 
refusal to accept certain proffered advertising without 
modifications requested by the newspaper. The Ninth Cir-
cuit firmly dismissed the would-be advertiser's claim of 
infringement of First Amendment rights. 
"Appellant has not convinced us that the Courts 
or any other governmental agency should dictate 
the contents of a newspaper." ld. at 135 (foot-
note om.). 
A similar result was reached in A vins v. Rutgers, 
State University of New Jersey, 385 F.2d 151 (3rd Cir. 
1967). The plaintiff in that case sought to compel the 
Rutgers Law Review to publish an article which it had 
previously rejected. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the District Court's decision, refusing to order 
publication even in a state-supported publication. 
"The right to freedom of speech does not open 
every avenue to one who desires to use a particu-
12 
lar outlet for expression ... Nor does freedom 
of speech comprehend the right to speak on any 
subject at any time . . . [Plaintiff] does not 
have the right, constitutional or otherwise, to 
commandeer the press and columns of the Rutgers 
Law Review for the publication of his article, at 
the expense of the subscribers to the Review and 
the New Jersey taxpayers, to the exclusion of 
other articles deemed by the editors to be more 
suitable for publication. On the contrary, the 
acceptance or rejection of articles submitted for 
publication in a law school law review necessarily 
involves the exercise of editorial judgment and 
this is in no wise lessened by the fact that the law 
review is supported, at least in part by the State." 
I d. at 153-54. 
'Td, Resident Participation of Denver, Inc. v. Love, 
F.Supp 1100 (D. Col. 1971). * 
While the precise form of governmental regulation 
~sue here may differ from that involved in Columbia 
ulcasting System and the cases discussed above, the 
•Without resorting to constitutional grounds, numerous other cases 
rejected the concept that a newspaper should be considered to 
"public utility" compelled to accept and publish all advertising 
ered to it. E.g., McGiU v. State, 209 Ga. 500, 74 S.E.2d 78, 81·82 
3); Chronicle & Gazette Pub. Co., Inc. v. Attorney General, 94 
148, 48 A.2d 478, 482 (1946), appeal dismissed, 329 U.S. 690 
7); Shuck v. Carroll Daily Herald, 215 Iowa 1276, 247 N.W. 813 
3); In re Louis Wohl, 50 F.2d 254, 255 (E.D. Mich. 1931); 
lenburg v. Times Pub. Co., 170 La. 3, 127 So. 345 (1930); 
'hkeepsie Buying Service, Inc. v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc., 
Misc. 982, 131 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1954); see Associated Press v. 
326 U.S.1, 19 (1945). 
'1. 
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question presented is exactly the same: whether news-
papers may be required to publish (either as a "reply" or 
directly), advertisements, editorials, and articles which in 
the exercise of editorial judgment would not otherwise be 
printed. Section 104.38, Fla. Stat., curtails the exercise of 
journalistic discretion in the determination of what will 
be published in exactly the same fashion as the demands 
made in Columbia Broadcasting System, and kindred cases. 
In terms of the exercise of editorial judgment and the 
maintenance of journalistic integrity, the distinction be-
tween a demand for a "right of reply" such as that in-
volved here and in Chicago Joint Board, Amal. Cloth. 
Workers, supra, and for "access" such as that raised in 
Avins, supra, is one without a difference. Both manifestly 
require the suspension of editorial discretion and permit 
the government through regulation to "commandeer the 
press and columns" of newspapers and thereby dictate the 
contents of those columns. 
Columbia Broadcasting System and similar cases 
unmistakably hold that deciding what to publish and what 
not to publish rests within journalistic discretion which 
is protected against any governmental intrusion by the 
First Amendment. The Florida Supreme Court, upholding 
the constitutionality of §104.38, Fla.Stat., espoused a 
diametrically opposite view-that decisions by newspapers 
as to what they will publish may be suspended or abridged 
by governmental regulation. The Florida Supreme Court's 
view of the protections accorded by the First Amendment 
to newspapers in this case is in basic and irreconcilable 
conflict with the scope of that protection as expressed in 
Columbia Broadcasting System and kindred cases. 
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2. Governmental regulations requiring publication 
must meet the same constitutional standards as. regulations 
prohibiting publication. 
The Florida Supreme Court's decision conflicts with 
the rationale of this Court in Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem because of its conclusion that regulations which 
affirmatively require publication somehow stand on a 
different constitutional footing than regulations prohibit-
ing publication. The decision below rests in large measure 
upon -this supposed distinction between these two types of 
regulations. For example, the Florida Supreme Court 
specifically states that §104.38, Fla. Stat., "does not con-
situte an incursion upon First Amendment rights or a 
prior restraint, since no specified newspaper content is 
excluded." (App. 8) (Emphasis in the original.) Thus, 
the Florida Supreme Court concluded that the statute at 
issue here, because it compels rather than prohibits publi-
cation, is not repugnant to the First Amendment. 
The First Amendment admits of no such distinction. 
As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Associ-
ates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., supra, "There is 
no difference between compelling publication of material 
that the newspaper wishes not to print and prohibiting a 
newspaper from printing news or other material." 440 
F.2d at 135. 
The majority of decisions in this Court which have 
tested various statutes against the First Amendment guar-
antees have been in cases involving statutory restrictions 
upon publication. Unless these restrictions have been justi-
fied by a clear and present danger to a compelling state 
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interest, the statutes have consistently been voided. E.g., 
Terminello v. Chic·ago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Musser v. Utah, 
333 U.S. 95 (1948) ; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). 
"The Government's power to censor the press 
was abolished so that the press would remain for-
ever free to censure the Government. The press 
was protected so that it could bare the secrets of 
government and inform the people. Only a free 
and unrestrained press can effectively expose de-
ception in government." New York Times Co. v. 
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (Justice Black 
concurring) (1971). 
Just as the First Amendment forbids unwarranted 
censorship of the press which would prohibit or restrain 
publication, a statute compelling a newspaper to publish 
specific information also violates the First Amendment. 
Both types of regulations "fetter" the maintenance of 
journalistic integrity and affect "the impartial distribution 
of news," Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 133 
(1973). Thus in sustaining a decree forbidding mono-
polistic activities of a press association, this Court care-
fully pointed out that the decree did "not compel AP or its 
members to permit publication of anything which their 
'reason' tells them should not be published." Associated 
Press v. U.S., supra at 20. Just as a State cannot prohibit 
publication in the absence of a clear and present danger to 
a compelling state interest, a state may not become an 
editor and compel publication. "[L] iberty of the press is 
in peril as soon as the government tries to compel what is 
to go into a newspaper." II Chafee, Government and Mass 
Communications 633 (1947). 
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3. There is no compelling state irvterest which justi-
fies the intrusions which the Florida statute makes upon 
freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment. 
First Amendment freedoms may not be impinged upon 
unless there is a clear and present danger of a serious 
substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, 
annoyance, or unrest. E.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 
252, 262-63 (1941); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947). 
Statutes prohibiting any type of publication, particularly 
criminal statutes, are presumed unconstitutional unless it 
can be demonstrated that the infringement is justified by 
a "clear and present danger" to a critical public interest. 
E.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) ; Asso-
ciated Press v. U.S., supra at 7. 
Although there is no available legislative history for 
the 1913 Florida statute, the Supreme Court of Florida 
discussed two possible objectives of the statute which were 
used to justify its constitutionality. First, the Florida 
Supreme Court cited a proper legislative purpose in en-
suring fair elections. This objective is insufficient basis for 
upholding the statute. This Court held in Mills v. Alabama, 
supra, that the reasonableness of a state's interest in fair 
elections cannot justify a criminal statute restricting the 
contents of a newspaper. Mills was ignored by the Supreme 
Court of Florida. 
The second attempted justification of the statute was 
as a counter to alleged monopolization and concentration in 
the media. Even if the monopolization and concentration 
issues had properly been before the Florida Supreme Court, 
these issues would have provided no justification for up-
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holding §104.38, Fla. Stat.* The Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts so ruled in a recent advisory opinion on 
the constitutionality of a proposed right of access statute. 
"The situation at which §39A [the proposed 
statute] is directed may be the 'monopolistic 
status' of certain news publications. However, 
complusion to publish all responsive political ad-
vertisements, applicable to all newspapers and 
other publications of general circulation in the 
Commonwealth, goes beyond what is essential to 
the furtherance of any interest of a State in its 
citizens having a right of access to newspapers in 
order to express, at their expense, political ideas 
which otherwise would not be published. See Bar-
ron, Access to the Press - A New First Amend-
ment Right, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1641, 1676-1678. 
Indeed no set of circumstances may exist which 
would support a legislative mandate that a news-
paper or other publication of general circulation 
must publish a political advertisement. The views 
expressed and implied in the opinion of the court 
and in the dissenting opinions in the Pittsburgh 
Press Co. case, supa, [Pittsburgh Press Co. v. 
Pittsburgh Committee on Human Relations, 
__ U.S. __ , 37 L.Ed.2d 669 (1973)] create 
substantial doubt that such legislation would pass 
*The Florida Supreme Court's contention on this issue went totally 
beyond the issues raised by the Record in the case before that Court, 
or the Briefs of the parties filed in that Court. The sole factual support 
for the Court's contention was a magazine article appended to an 
Amicus Curiae Brief filed by an attorney on his own behalf. The Flor-
ida Supreme Court had never before taken judicial notice of such an 
article, much less given it substantive weight. In so doing, the Court 
violated its own rules, and abridged fundamental due process. 
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constitutional muster.". Opinion of the Justices, 
298 N.E.2d 829, 835 (Mass. 1973) (footnote om.). 
Similar arguments of lack of access were asserted in 
Resident Participation of Denver, Inc. v. Love, supra, but 
the three-judge Court rejected the contention that news-
papers can constitutionally be required to furnish free 
space for expression of views of citizens. 
"We are aware that lack of access to those 
media which reach large audiences has, some be-
lieve, given birth to a frustration which compels 
otherwise peaceful citizens to engage in violence 
to get their views to the nation. A cause of this 
frustration, one critic maintains, is that, although 
the courts have been vigorous in protecting free 
speech, they have been indifferent to creating op-
portunities for expression. Barron, Access to the 
Press- A New First Amendment Right, 80 
Harv.L.Rev. 1641 (1967). We note, however, that 
while Professor Barron spends considerable space 
exploring a statutory solution to this problem, he 
devotes much less attention to constitutional argu-
ments and but one paragraph to the problem of 
st.ate action, which we find insurmountable. Pro-
fessor Barron simply concludes, without notice-
able explanation, that newspapers can be sub-
jected to the 'constitutional restrictions which 
quasi-public status invites.' Id. at 1669. As desir-
able as this result might be, we are unable in 
good faith to reach it." 322 F.Supp. at 1105. 
The separate opinion of Justice Douglas in Columbia 
Broadcasting likewise recognized and disposed of the con-
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' tention. that alleged concentration in the media can be 
cured by a government fiat to be fair. 
"Thomas I. Emerson, our leading First Amend-
ment scholar has stated that 
' ... any effort to solve the broader problems 
of a monopoly press by forcing newspapers to 
cover all "newsworthy" events and print all view-
points, under the watchful eyes of petty public 
officials, is likely to undermine such independence 
as the press now shows without achieving any real 
diversity.' The System of Freedom of Expression 
(1970), p. 671." - U.S. at _, 36 L.Ed.2d 
at 811. 
In addition to §104.38, there appear to have been 
only two similar "right of reply" statutes enacted in the 
United States. Miss. Code Ann. §3175 (1942) and Nev.Rev. 
Stat. §200.570 (1963) .* The Mississippi statute was evis-
cerated in Manasco v. Walley, 63 So.2d 91 (Miss. 1953), 
which held that the statute could be invoked only if the 
publication concerning the candidate was libelous, even 
though the statute by its terms is invoked by a publication 
"reflect[ing] upon the honesty, integrity or moral char-
acter" of a candidate. ld. at 96. Nevada repealed its man-
datory "right of reply" statute in 1969, and replaced it 
*In addition, Wis. Stat. §895.05 provides that publication of a 
reply in lieu of a retraction prohibits a recovery against a newspaper 
in a defamation action other than actual damages. There is, further· 
more, a fundamental difference between a right of retraction statute and 
the right of reply statute at issue here: the former is permissive, miti· 
,gating damages if a retraction is made and thus intended to encourage 
freedom of expression; the reply statute by contrast, is mandatory, with 
penal sanctions, and is designed to control the exercise of editorial 
discretion. 
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with a retraction statute. Ch. 310, Laws of Nevada, 
Fifty-Fifth Session (Act of April 14, 1969). The paucity 
of such legislation and the history of the few statutes 
that have been enacted illustrates the lack of necessity 
for "right of reply" or "access" to ensure that a diversity 
of views and ideas are disseminated among the people. 
Such legislation is inimical to our system of freedom of 
expression. Nevertheless, if the decision of the Florida 
Supreme Court is not reversed, it is likely that other States 
will consider similar statutes in a misguided effort to 
legislate fairness. 
For these reasons, the solution to "the broader 
problems of a monopoly press" do not lie, as the Florida 
Supreme Court mistakenly conceived, in the imposition of 
regulations which substitute the government for the editor 
in the determination of what should be published. Indeed, 
as the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts made 
plain in its Opinion, supra, there are "no set of circum-
stances . . . which would support a legislative mandate 
that a newspaper . . . must publish." 
4. The Florida Supreme Court's attempted analogy 
between permissible regulation of the press and of the 
broadcast media is invidious. 
Whatever continuing validity may inhere in the de-
cision in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 
(1969), this Court's subsequent decision in Columbia 
Broadcasting System leaves no doubt that the fairness 
doctrine is applicable and constitutionally permissible, 
if at all, solely and exclusively in the context of the broad-
cast media. It has long been recognized that differences 
between the media may justify differences in the extent 
to which First Amendment protection~ are accorded. 
' 
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Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). It may well be 
that Red Lion, supra, represents the outer limit of per-
missible governmental regulation of the content of radio 
and television station broadcasts, as this Court suggested 
in Columbia Broadcasting System. In any event, as Profes-
sor Emerson points out in his discussion of the significance 
of the Red Lion decision, 
"Government regulation designed to promote the 
system of freedom of expression takes on quite 
a different cast when it is applied to media of 
communication other than radio and television." 
Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 
667 (1970). 
The Florida Supreme Court's decision simply over-
looks the fundamental constitutional distinction between 
the broadcast media and the press. In a remarkable 
analysis, the Court asserted that newspapers are sub-
ject to the same regulation as broadcast media because 
newspapers make use of the airwaves in their operations 
through telegraphs and other means of telecommunication. 
(App. 18) Carried to its logical conclusion, this line of 
reasoning would fully sustain, for example, regulations 
requiring newspapers to be licensed before they begin 
operations. That is precisely the sort of regulation which 
the framers of the First Amendment fully intended to 
forbid. The attempted analogy of the Court below between 
the statute at issue here and the question presented in Red 
Lion, supra, thus completely overlooks the fundamental 
differences, both in technology and in First Amendment 
principles, which exist between newspapers and the broad-
cast media. 
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That such a distinction does exist and is sustained 
on policy grounds is plain. It was recently reemphasized 
by this Court in Columbia Broadcasting System, supra, 
in the following language: 
"The tensions inherent in such a regulatory 
structure [of broadcasting] emerge more clearly 
when we compare a private newspaper with a 
broadcast licensee. The power of a privately 
owned newspaper to advance its own political, 
social, and economic views is bounded by only two 
factors: first, the acceptance of a sufficient 
number of readers - and hence advertisers -
to assur~ financial success; and, second, the 
journalistic integrity of its editors and pub-
lishers." __ U.S. at __ , 36 L.Ed.2d at 792. 
In Columbia Broadcasting System, this Court went 
on to say that the measure of freedom accorded to broad-
casters is "not as large as that exercised by a newspaper." 
ld. If broadcasters cannot constitutionally be compelled 
to abdicate editorial discretion and accept material for 
broadcast, it follows, a fortiori, that newspapers whose 
range of discretion is even greater cannot be subjected 
to regulation which requires them to publish materials 
against their will. 
The Columbia Broadcasting case was decided on May 
29, 1973, after briefs had been submitted to the Florida 
Supreme Court in this case, but the decision was promptly 
called to the attention of that Court. Nevertheless, the 
Florida Supreme Court did not even mention Columbia 
Broadcasting in its per curiam opinion. Columbia 
Broadcasting was mentioned only in the specially concur-
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" ring opinion filed by Justice Roberts, in which five other 
members of the Court joined. Justice Roberts correctly 
reasoned that the Columbia Broadcasting case was dis-
tinguishable due to the differences between broadcast and 
other media. However, having distinguished broadcast 
media from other media, Justice Roberts reached the 
amazing conclusion that the press can be subjected to 
even nwre regulation than the broadcast media. Justice 
Roberts further asserted that the Court's per curiam 
opinion, which rested heavily upon the Red Lion case, did 
not conflict with Columbia Broadcasting, because Red Lion 
was adhered to in the later decision. A distinction was 
further discerned in that Columbia Broadcasting rejected 
a requirement that broadcasters accept paid advertising 
because, among other things, this would provide access 
only to the affluent, whereas the Florida statute provides 
access regardless of ability to pay. Such logic flies directly 
in the face of the long-established constitutional principle 
that the only basis for any regulation of the content of 
broadcasting is its unique use of limited airwaves. E.g., 
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Na-
tional Committee, supra; Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. 
FCC, supra; National Broadcasting Company v. United 
States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943). 
The difference, therefore, between regulation which 
may be permissible in the context of radio and television 
and that which is permitted with respect to the news-
papers derives from the basic technology of the two media. 
As this Court recognized long ago in National Broadcast-
ing Company v. U.S., supra, the regulation of broadcasting 
is virtually unavoidable since all who wish to speak over 
the airwaves simply cannot be permitted to do so or none 
will be heard. Whether the necessity of licensing broadcast 
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stations and the technology limitations of the spectrum 
are, of themselves, a sufficient ground to justify the 
Fairness Doctrine is, in light of this Court's evolving 
views as expressed in Columbia Broadcasting System, open 
to question. In any case, the only grounds upon which the 
Fairness Doctrine can be sustained is "the unique charac-
teristics of electronic communication." Capital Broadcast-
ing Co. v. John Mitchell, 333 F.Supp 582 (D.D.C. 1971), 
aff'd 405 U.S. 1000 (1972). 
The direct conflict between the attempt by the Florida 
Supreme Court to draw an analogy between the broadcast 
and print media and this Court's views is illustrated by 
the following excerpts from the Court's opinion in Colum-
bia Broadcasting System: 
" [ T] he broadcast media pose unique and special 
problems not present in the traditional free speech 
case. Unlike other media, broadcasting is subject 
to an inherent physical limitation .... The Court 
spoke to this reality when, in Red Lion, we said 
'it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amend-
ment right to broadcast comparable to the right 
of every individual to speak, write, or publish.' 
Red Lion, supra, 395 U.S., at 388." __ U.S. 
at __ , 36 L.Ed.2d at 783. 
* * * 
"Nor can we accept the Court of Appeals view 
that every potential speaker is 'the best judge' 
of what the listening public ought to hear or in-
deed the best judge of the merits of his or her 
views. All journalistic tradition and experience is 
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' " to the contrary. For better or worse, editing is 
what editors are for; and editing is selection and 
choice of material." __ U.S. at __ , 36 L.Ed.2d at 
796. 
Similar views were expressed in the concurring opin-
ions of Justices Douglas and Stewart: 
Justice Douglas: 
"It would come as a surprise to the public as 
well as to publishers and editors of newspapers 
to be informed that a newly created federal 
bureau would hereafter provide 'guidelines' for 
newspapers or promulgate rules that would give 
a federal agency power to ride herd on the pub-
lishing business to make sure that fair comment 
on all current issues was made. 
* * * 
"Of course there is private censorship in the 
newspaper field. But for one publisher who may 
suppress a fact, there are many who will print it. 
But if the government is the censor, administra-
tive fiat not freedom of choice carries the day." 
__ U.S. at __ , 36 L.Ed.2d at 811, 812. 
Justice Stewart: 
"There is never a paucity of arguments in 
favor of limiting the freedom of the press. The 
Court of Appeals concluded that greater govern-
ment control of press freedom is acceptable here 
because of the scarcity of frequencies for broad-
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casting. But there are many more broadcasting 
stations than there are daily newspapers. 
* * * 
"Perhaps I overstate the logic of the opinion of 
the Court of Appeals. Perhaps its 'balancing' of 
First Amendment 'values' would require no more 
than that newspapers be compelled to give 'lim-
ited' access to dissident voices, and then only if 
those voices were 'responsible'. And perhaps it 
would require that such access be compelled only 
. when there was a single newspaper in a particu-
lar community. But it would be a close ques-
tion for me which of these various alternative 
results would be more grossly violative of the 
First Amendment's guarantee of a free press. 
For that guarantee gives .every newspaper the 
liberty to print what it chooses and reject what 
it chooses, free from the intrusive editorial thumb 
of Government." __ U.S. at __ , 36 L.Ed.2d 
at 807-808. 
(Footnotes omitted) 
The attempt by the Florida Supreme Court to analo-
gize §104.38, Fla. Stat., with the Fairness Doctrine must, 
therefore, necessarily fail. The supposed analogy ignores 
completely the express and repeated statements by this 
Court that such constitutional merit as the Fairness Doc-
trine may have rests entirely on the "unique and special 
problems" presented by the technology of the electronics 
media which are wholly absent in the instant case. The 
reliance of the Court below upon Red Lion was thus error. 
If its decision permitted to stand, it will obliterate the 
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distinctions which this Court has found to exist between 
the media and will accord to newspapers a lesser measure 
of journalistic freedom than that accorded to broadcasters. 
5. The effect of the Florida statute will be to re-
duce, not increase, the flow of expression of political 
views. 
Section 104.38, Fla. Stat., cannot be permitted to stand 
because there is no compelling state interest to sustain a 
regulation which suspends the unfettered exercise of edi-
torial discretion and requires the publication of material 
against the newspaper's will. The impact upon the vital 
role of a free press, if this statute is upheld, will be pro-
found. 
"A free press stands as one of the greater inter-
preters between the government and the people. 
To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves." 
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 
2·50 (1936). 
The Florida Supreme Court ignored numerous First 
Amendment cases in which statutes have been struck 
down which might have a constitutionally impermissible 
chilling effect on freedom of expression. For example, one 
of the principal reasons for the doctrine announced in 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), 
was to provide more "elbow room" for free expression 
on subjects of public interest and concern. 
" ... would-be critics of official conduct may 
be deterred from voicing their criticism, even 
28 
though it is believed to be true and even 
though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether 
it can be proved in court or ~ear of the expense 
of having to do so. They tend to make only state-
ments which 'steer far wider of the unlawful 
zone.' Speiser v. Randall, supra, 357 U.S. at 526. 
The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the 
variety of public debate. It is inconsistent with 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 
279. 
See also, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 52-53 
(1971) ; Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). 
As the District of Columbia held in Washington Post 
Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. 
d,enied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967) : 
"Unless persons, including newspapers, desir-
ing to exercise their First Amendment rights 
are assured freedom from the harassment of law-
suits, they will tend to become self-censors. And 
to this extent debate on public issues and the con-
duct of public officials will become less unin-
hibited, less robust, and less wide-open, for self-
censorship affecting the whole public is 'hardly 
less virulent for being privately administered.' " 
The intrusion of §104.38, Fla. Stat., reaches to "any 
matter" published in a newspaper, presumably including 
not only editorials, which were the basis of Tornillo's com-
plaint in this case, but also news stories, columns, advertis-
ing, cartoons, and any other material. The statute, there-
fore, sweeps far broader than the narrow regulation of 
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classified advertising cautiously upheld by this Court in 
Pittsburgh Press Company v. Pittsburgh Commission on 
Human Relations, __ U.S. __ , 37 L.Ed.2d 669 (1973). 
If a newspaper cannot print publications concerning 
political candidates unless it is prepared to publish their 
"replies" at its expense, the newspaper will be deterred 
from making the initial publications. Conscientious news-
papers will be reluctant to print anything concerning im-
pending elections if in doing so they become obligated 
to provide free space for "replies" that may be antithetical 
to the newspapers' views. Such "replies" could be obscene 
or libelous. The potential expense of printing the "replies" 
could be substantial due to the large number of candidates 
and the considerable amount of space that every responsible 
newspaper in this state devotes to coverage of elections. 
The deterrent effect of the statute is even more severe 
because it provides for criminal penalties, even though its 
interpretation is subject to considerable uncertainty, as 
discussed below. 
B. The Vagueness and Ambiguity of the Flor-
ida Statute Significantly Increase Its Uncon-
stitutional Effect Upon Legitimate Expres-
sion 
Even if some form of reply or access statute might 
theoretically be compatible with the First Amendment, 
§104.38, Fla. Stat., is not such a statute. The statute's 
vagueness and ambiguity result in uncertainty as to its 
meaning, greatly increasing its inhibitory effect upon 
the free expression protected by the First Amendment. 
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It is fundamental that restrictions upon free expres-
sion, even if otherwise constitutional, may violate the First 
Amendment if they are insufficiently precise. 
"Vague laws in any area suffer a constitu-
tional infirmity. When First Amendment rights 
are involved, we look even more closely lest, under 
the guise of regulating conduct that is reachable 
by the police power, freedom of speech or of the 
press suffer." Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 
200 (1966). (fn.om.) 
The constitutional test of definiteness is particularly 
strict in the case of a criminal statute such as §104.38, 
Fla. Stat. E.g., NAACP v. Bwtton, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 
(1963); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948). 
The principal ambiguities in the statute include the 
following: 
(i) What is a "newspaper"? Does the term include 
any publication, such as magazines, newsletters, pamphlets, 
brochures and handbills? Does it include "newspapers" 
published in other states but circulated in Florida? 
(ii) Does the term "columns" in the statute include 
editorials, signed columns, news articles and letters to the 
editor? Does the term include advertisements? Cartoons? 
Does the term include replies published pursuant to 
§104.38, Fla. Stat.? 
(iii) What is an "assault" on personal character, 
or an "attack" on an official record? Do they merely en-
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compass criticism, no matter how truthful or valid? Does 
personal character include any individual human quality? 
(iv) Need a "candidate" be mentioned specifically 
by name to be entitled to a reply, or does a reply right 
arise if a "candidate" can be identified in a publication, 
even though not named? If a publication refers to a group, 
does each member of the group have a right to reply? 
(v) What is an equally "conspicuous" place for pub-
lication of a reply? Is page four of a newspaper as con-
spicuous as page five? 
(vi) How lengthy a reply may be made? If a news-
paper editorial states only, "John Doe is not fit for office," 
what is the length of the permitted reply? Seven words? 
Can a statute providing such a "reply" be seriously con-
sidered as enhancing public discussion? 
Although both lower Florida courts which passed upon 
the statute held it void for vagueness, the Florida Supreme 
Court sought to circumvent this obstacle in two ways. 
First, the Court sought to resolve certain ambiguities in 
the statute by interpretation, holding that a newspaper 
need not publish a reply unless it was: 
"wholly responsive to the charge made in the edi-
torial or other article in a newspaper being re-
plied to and further that such reply will be 
neither libelous nor slanderous of the publication 
nor anyone else, nor vulgar nor profane." (App. 
16) 
32 
Such an interpretive approach which seeks to remedy 
massive gaps in the statute cannot cure constitutional in-
firmities. Criminal statutes affecting freedom of expres-
sion must delineate precise standards of conduct without 
resort to wholesale judicial construction. Winters v. New 
York, supra at 515 (1948); Ashton v. Kentucky, supra; 
NAACP v. Button, supra. Moreover, despite the Florida 
Supreme Court's efforts, major ambiguities and uncer-
tainties remain. The unconstitutional effect of the statute 
cannot be diminished by the Court's intentions, expressed 
in its per curiam decision denying the Petition for Rehear-
ing, to refine and define the statute's terms in future 
cases. E.g.,Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966). 
The second aspect of the Florida Supreme Court's 
curative effort was its holding that because the plaintiff 
was seeking only civil remedies, the Court need not pass 
upon whether the statute measured up to standards re-
quired of criminal statutes. The Court reasoned that even 
if the statute was impermissibly vague so that it could 
not be the basis of a criminal prosecution, the statute 
was sufficient for an implied civil right of action. The 
Court thus held, in effect, that an unconstitutionally vague 
criminal statute may be invoked for a civil remedy. Such 




In upholding the constitutionality of §104.38, Florida 
Statutes, the Supreme Court of Florida ignored funda-
mental First Amendment principles. The questions pre-
sented by this appeal are substantial, with major implica-
tions for the public interest in freedom of speech and of 
the press. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO. 43,009 
PAT L. TORNILLO, JR., 
Appellant, 
vs. 
THE. MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING COMPANY, 
a Division of Knight Newspapers, Inc., 
Appellee. 
July 18, 1973 
PER CURIAM 
This cause is before us upon direct appeal from Cir-
cuit Court of Dade County, holding Florida Statute 104.381 
unconstitutional thereby vesting jurisdiction in this Court 
under Article V, Section 3 (b) ( 1) , Florida Constitution, 
as amended 1973. 
1F.S. § 104.38- Newspaper assailing candidate in an election; 
space for reply - If any newspaper in its columns assails the personal 
character of any candidate for nomination or :for election in any elec-
tion, or charges said candidate with malfeasance or misfeasance in 
office, or otherwise attacks his official record, or gives to another free 
space for such purpose, such newspaper shall upon request of such 
candidate immediately publish free of cost any reply he may make 
thereto in as conspicuous a place and in the same kind of type as the 
matter that calls for such reply, provided such reply does not take up 
more space than the matter replied to. Any person or firm failing to 
comply with the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misde-





Appellant Tornillo, plaintiff below, who was a candi-
date for the State Legislature demanded that appellee print 
verbatim his replies to two editorials printed therein attack-
ing appellant's personal character. The appellee refused 
and Tornillo filed complaint for declaratory and injunctive 
relief and punitive damages. Pursuant to Florida Statute 
86.091, the Attorney General of this State was advised that 
appellant intended to contest the constitutionality vel non 
of Florida Statute 104.38. In view of the circumstances, the 
trial court granted the request for an emergency hearing. 
Preliminarily, the trial court determined that the 
statutory provision in question is a criminal statute and 
that absent special circumstances, equity will not ordinarily 
enjoin commission of a crime. Pompano Horse Club Co. v. 
State, 93 Fla. 415, 111 So. 801 (1927). Notwithstanding 
this infirmity in appellant's complaint, the trial court fur-
ther concluded that F.S. §104.38 is violative of Article I, 
Sections 4 and 9 of the Constitution of Florida and the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States as a restraint upon freedom of speech and press and 
because ifis impermissibl~_vague and indefinite. 
~-
Believing that the promulgation of this statute is 
authorized by Article IV, Section 4,Z and the First3 and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
2Section 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in 
this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each 
of them against invasion; and On Application of the Legislature, or ol 
the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against do-
mestic Violence. 
3 Amendment I. Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press; . . . 
' 
App. 3 
States, and Article VI, Section 1,4 and Article I, Section 45 
of the Florida Constitution, and believing that this statute 
G enhances rather than abridges freedom of speech and press 
protected by the First Amendment, we hold that it does 
not constitute a violation of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States or 
Article I, Section 4, Florida Constitution. 
The election of leaders of our government by a major-
ity of the qualified electors is the fundamental precept 
upon which our system of government is based, and is an 
integral part of our nation's history. Recognizing that 
there is a right to publish without prior governmental 
restraint,6 we also emphasize that there is a correlative 
responsibility that the public be fully informed. 
~- --
The entire concept of freedom of expression as seen 
by our founding fathers rests upon the necessity .for a fully 
informed._electorate.-.J ames Madison wrote that, "A popu-
lar government without popular information or the means 
of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or tragedy; or, 
perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; 
4Section l. Regulation of elections. - All elections by the people 
shall he by direct and secret vote. General elections shall he deter· 
mined by a plurality of votes cast. Registration and elections shall, and 
political party functions may, be regulated by law. 
5Section 4. Freedom of speech and press. - Every person may 
speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects hut shall he 
responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall he passed to re· 
strain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal 
prosecutions and civil actions for defamation the truth may he given 
in evidence. If the matter charged as defamatory is true and was pub. 
lished with good motives, the party shall he acquitted or exonerated. 
6Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, New York Times v. United 
States, 430 U.S. 713, Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, La· 
monet v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301. 
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and a people who mean to be their own governors, must 
arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives 
(toW. T. Barry, August 4, 1822) ."7 
-The _public "need •tg }cnow" is most criticaLdliT.!Q.g ~ 
electi.Qn cainpaign. By enactment of the first comprehensive 
corrup~ct relating to primary elections iri 1909 
our legislature responded to the need for insuring free and 
fair elections. Article III, Section 26, and Article VI, Sec-
tion 9, Constitution of Florida 1885, commanded the Legis-
lature to pass laws "regulating elections and prohibiting 
under adequate penalties, all undue influence thereof from 
power, bribery, tumult or other improper practices" and 
to "enact such laws as will preserve the purity of the 
ballot given under this Constitution." This act of 1909 did 
not deal with the subject of the wrongful use of news-
papers or other printed or written matter, with the excep-
tion of a provision which declared it to be a misdemeanor 
for any candidate or other person to have or distribute on 
day of primary at or near any polling place any writing 
against any candidate in the primary. Florida Statute 
104.38 was originally enacted in 1913 as Chapter 6470, 
Section 12, Laws of Florida, 1913.8 This second act adopted 
----· ---
76 Writings of James Madison 398 (Hunt Ed. 1906), The Com· 
plete Madison 337 ( 1953). 
8Chapter 6470, Section 12 (Laws of Florida, 1913), provided, "That 
if any newspaper in its columns assails the personal character of any 
candidate for nomination in a primary election, or charges such can-
didate with malfeasance or misfeasance in office, or otherwise attacks 
his official record, or gives to another free space for such purpose, such 
newspaper shall, upon request of such candidate, immediately publish 
free of cost any reply he may make thereto, in as conspicuous a place 
and in the same kind of type as the matter that calls for such reply; 
provided, such reply does not take up more space than the matter 
replied to. A person who fails to comply with the provisions of this 
Section, shall upon conviction be punished by fine not exceeding five 
hundred dollars, or by imprisonment." See subsequent history of stat· 
' App. 5 ,, 
-in 1913 known as the corrupt practices act was enacted to 
.supplement the act of 1909. The statutory provision, the 
constitutionality vel non which is being questioned in the 
instant cause, was enacted not to punish, coerce or censor 
the press but rather as a part of a centuries old legislative 
task of maintaining conditions conducive to free and fair 
elections. The Legislature in 1913 decided that owners of 
the printing press had already achieved such political clout 
that when they engaged in character assailings, the victim's 
electoral chances were unduly and improperly diminished. 
To assure fairness in campaigns, the assailed candidate had 
to be provided with an equivalent opportunity to respond; 
otherwise not only the candidate would be hurt but also 
the people would be deprived of both sides of the contro-
versy.9 
What some segments of the press seem to lose sight 
of is that the First Amendment guarantee is "not for the 
ute, Section 5927, Revised General Statutes of Florida, 1920, entitled 
newspaper assailing candidate must give free space for reply. This 
provision was re-enacted as Section 875.40, Florida Statutes, which 
varies only slightly from the present law. Section 875.40, Florida 
Statutes was identical to Chapter 6470, Section 12 (Laws of Florida, 
1913). In 1951, the Legislature renumbered and slightly revised this 
provision to cover any elections (not just primaries) and to provide 
that, "Any one failing to comply with the provisions of the section 
shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a misdemeanor." Chapter 268.70, 
Laws of Florida, 1951. Section 104.38 was entitled, "Newspaper assail· 
ing candidate in election; space for reply." See also Chapter 28151, 
General Laws, 1953, which adds the words "or for election" so that 
the preliminary portion of the statute reads: "If any newspaper in 
its columns assails the personal character of any candidate for nom· 
ination or for election in any election ... " In 1972, HB 2801 at· 
tempting to repeal F.S. 104.38 died in committee. 
9£x Parte Hawthorne, ll6 Fla. 608, 156 So. 619 (1934). 9 Florida 
L.J. 297 (1935), "Brief History of the Corrupt Practices Act of Florida," 
J. V. Keen. 
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benefit of the press so much as for the benefit of us all.1110 
Speech concerning public affairs is more than self expres-
sion. It is the essence of self government. u 
Mr. Justice Learned Hand expressed the role of the 
press well when he emphasized, 
"However neither exclusively, nor even primarily 
are the interests of the newspaper industry con-
clusive; for that industry serves one of the most 
vital of all general interests: The dissemination 
of news from as many different sources and with 
as many different facets and colors as possible."12 
In Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946), the 
Supreme Court of the United States emphasized that the 
power of the press must be tempered with responsibility 
when it explained, 
"Without a free press there can be no free soci-
ety. Freedom of the press, however, is not an 
end in itself but a means to the end of a free 
society. The scope and nature of the constitu-
tional protection of freedom of speech must be 
viewed in that light and in that light applied. . . . 
"A free press is vital to a democratic society 
because its freedom gives it power. Power in a 
democracy implies responsibility in its exercise. 
10Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389. 
11Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74.75 (1964). 
12United States v. Associated Press, 52 F.Supp. 362, 372. 
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' 
No institution in a democracy, either govern-
mental or private, can have absolute power. Nor 
can the limits of power which enforce responsi-
bil~ty be finally determined by the limited power 
itself . ... In plain English, freedom carries with 
it responsibility even for the press; freedom of 
the press is not a freedom from responsibility for 
its exercise. Most State constitutions expressly 
provide for liability for abuse of the press's free-
dom. That there was such legal liability was so 
taken for granted by the framers of the First 
Amendment that it was not spelled out. Respon-
sibility for its abuse was embedded in the law. 
The First Amendment safeguarded that right. 
"The press does have the right, which is its pro-
fessional function, to criticize and to advocate. 
The whole gamut of public affairs is the domain 
for fearless and critical comment, and not the 
least the administration of justice. But the public 
function which belongs to the press makes it an 
obligation of honor to exercise this function only 
with the fullest sense of responsibility. Without 
such a lively sense of responsibility a free press 
may readily become a powerful instrument of 
injustice." [Emphasis Supplied] 
The concept which appears throughout the decisions 
underlying First Amendment guarantees that there is a 
broad societal interest in the free flow of information to 
the public by the Supreme Court of the United States was 
explicitly stated in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254 (1964), as well as other Supreme Court decisions, as 
follows: 
App. 8 
"The general prop'Osition that freedom of expres-
sion upon public questions is secured by the First 
Amendment has long been settled by our decisions. 
The constitutional safeguard we have said, 'was 
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of 
ideas for the bringing about of political and social 
changes desired by the people.' Roth vs. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, 1506, 
77 S.Ct. 1304. The maintenance of the opportunity 
for free political discussion to the end that gov-
ernment may be responsive to the will of the 
people and that changes may be obtained by law-
ful means, an opportunity essential to the security 
of the republic, is a fundamental principle of the 
constitutional system." 
The statute here under consideration is designed to 
I f add to the--now--of information and ideas and does nOt constitute an incurSionu-po;- Fir:~mendment rights or · 
a prior restraint, since no spe~ifi~is 
_excluded. There is nothing prohibited but rather it requires, 
in the interest of full and fair discussion, additional infor-
mation. 
The right of the public to know all sides of a contro-
versy and from such information to be able to make an 
enlightened choice is being jeopardized by the growing con-
centration of the ownership of the mass media into fewer 
and fewer hands, resulting ultimately in a form of private 
censorship. Through consolidation, syndication, acquisition 
of radio and television stations and the demise of vast 
numbers of newspapers, competition is rapidly vanishing 
and news corporations are acquiring monopolistic influence 
over huge areas of the country. We take note of a recent 
App. 9 
" 
" article in Florida Trend magazine, March 1973, explic, 
ing that the Miami Herald is the largest newspaper p1 
lished in Florida, that it is larger in size than the next t 
largest newspapers; and that it is not only a large c 
daily newspaper but also is a regional and internati01 
newspaper. 
Freedom of expression was retained by the peo] 
through the First Amendment for all the people and ? 
merely for .a select few. The First Amendment did 1 
create a privileged class which through a monopoly 
instruments of the newspaper industry would be able 
deny to the people the freedom of expression which 1 
First Amendment guarantees. The Supreme Court of 1 
United States in Associated Press v. United States, ~ 
U.S. 1, 20, clearly expounded, 
"It would be strange indeed, however, if the grave 
concern for freedom of the press which prompted 
adoption of the First Amendment should be read 
as a command that the government was without 
power to protect that freedom. The First Amend-
ment, far from providing an argument against 
application of the Sherman Act, here provides 
powerful reasons to the contrary. That Amend-
ment rests on the assumption that the widest 
possible dissemination of information from di-
verse and antagonistic sources is essential to the 
welfare of the public, that a free press is a con-
dition of a free society. Surely a command that 
the government itself shall not impede the free 
flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental 
combinations a refuge if they impose restraints 
upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. 
App. 10 
Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not 
for some. Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the 
Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep 
others from publishing is not. Freedom of the 
press from governmental interference under the 
First Amendment does not sanction repression 
of that freedom by private interests. The First 
Amendment affords not the slightest support for 
the contention that a combination to restrain 
trade in news and views has any constitutional 
immunity." 
More_ recently in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 
381 F.2d 908, affirmed 395 U.S. 367 (1969), the Supreme 
Court opined, 
"Nor can we say that it is inconsistent with the 
First Amendment goal of producing an informed 
public capable of conducting its own affairs to 
require a broadcaster to permit answers to per-
sonal attacks occurring in the course of discussing 
controversial issues, or to require that the politi-
cal opponents of those endorsed by the station be 
given a chance to communicate with the public. 
Otherwise, station owners and a few networks 
would have unfettered power to make time avail-
able only to the highest bidders, to communicate 
only their own views on public issues, people and 
candidates, and to permit on the air only those 
with whom they agreed. There is no sanctuary in 
the First Amendment for unlimited private cen-
sorship operating in a medium not open to all. 
'Freedom of the press from governmental inter-
ference under the First Amendment does not 
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" " sanction repression of that freedom by private 
interests.' Associated Press v. United States, 326 
u.s. 1, 20 (1945) ." 
By this tendency toward monopolization, the voice of the 
press tends to become exclusive in its observation and its 
wisdom which in turn deprives the public of their right 
to know both sides of controversial matters. 
Appellant urges that if a newspaper may attack a 
candidate with impunity and he is provided no right to 
reply, the public interest in free expression suffers, be-
cause they can only hear the publisher's side of the contro-
versy and are denied the dissenting view. 
Although we have carefully considered appellee's argu-
ment that Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C .. supra, is 
inapplicable ~o the present cause, we cannot discount cer-
tain excerpts therefrom which ~applicable.- to First. 
~mendment guarantees in general. Therein, the Supreme 
Court explained that, 
"Congress does not abridge freedom of speech or 
press by legislation directly or indirectly multi-
plying the voices and views presented to the public 
through time sharing, fairness doctrines, or other 
devices which limit or dissipate the power of those 
who sit astride the channels of communication." -395 U.S. at 401, n. 28.-- --
That Court further stated in Red Lion Broadcasting v. 
F.C.C., supra, at 390, in Associated Press v. U.S., supra, 
at 20, and New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, at 270, 
that it is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve 
App. 12 
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas wherein truth will 
prevail rather than to countenance a monopolization of 
that market whether by government or private enterprise. 
Florida's right of reply statute is consistent with the 
First Amendment as applied to this State through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In Rosenbloom v. M etromedia. 403 
U.S. 29, 47, we find that the Supreme Court of the United 
States is inclined to this position by the following quote 
from the majority opinion: 
"Furthermore, in First Amendment terms, the 
cure seems far worse than the disease. If the 
States fear that private citizens will not be able 
to respond adequately to publicity involving them, 
the solution lies in the direction of ensuring their 
ability to respond, rather than in stifling public 
discussion of matters of public concern." 
To this comment, the Court appended the following note: 
"Some States have adopted retraction statutes or 
right-of-reply statutes. See Donnelly, The Right 
of Reply: An Alternative to an Action for Libel, 
34 Va. L.Rev. 867 (1948); Note, Vindication of 
the Reputation of a Public Official, 80 Harv. 
L.Rev. 1730 (1967) . Cf. Red Lion Broadcasting 
Co. v . FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
"One writer, in arguing that the First Amend-
ment itself should be read to guarantee a right 
of access to the media not limited to a right to 
respond to defamatory falsehoods, has suggested 
several ways the law might encourage public dis-
' 
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cussion. Barron, Access to the Press - A New 
First Amendment Right, 80 Har. L. Rev. 1641, 
1666-1678 (1967). It is important to recognize 
that the private individual often desires press ex-
posure either for himself, his ideas, or his causes. 
Constitutional adjudication must take into account 
the individual's interest in access to the press as 
well as the individual's interest in preserving his 
reputation, even though libel actions by their na-
ture encourage a narrow view of the individual's 
interest since they focus only on situations where 
the individual has been harmed by undesired press 
attention. A constitutional rule that deters the 
press from covering the ideas or activities of the 
private individual thus conceives the individual's 
interest too narrowly." 
Although appellee attempts to minimize the import of the 
aforestated quotation, we feel compelled to note that such 
remarks regarding right to reply legislation are entirely 
consistent with past precedent establishing the fundamen-
tal purpose of the First Amendment to inform the people. 
Neither appellant nor appellee takes issue with the 
holding of the trial court that it lacked jurisdiction to 
enjoin an alleged violation of Florida Statute 104.38. This 
provision is criminal in nature and absent special circum-
stances equity will usually not enjoin commission of a 
crime.13 
Appellant urges that the Right of Reply Statute in 
question is neither impermissibly vague nor unnecessarily 
13Pompano Horse Club Co. v. State, supra, 17 Fla. Jur. Injunctions, 
§46. 
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broad. We must agree and therefore uphold the constitu-
tionality of this statutory provision. It is a fundamental 
principle that this Court has the duty, if reasonably pos-
sible, consistent with protection of constitutional rights, to 
resolve all doubts as to the validity of a statute in favor 
of its constitutionality and if reasonably possible a statute 
should be construed so as not to conflict with the constitu-
tion.14 Courts are inclined to adopt that reasonable inter-
pretation of a statute which removes it farthest from con-
stitutional infirmity. In Gitlow v. People of New York, 
268 U.S. 652, the Supreme Court of the United States 
stated every presumption is to be indulged in favor of the 
validity of a statute, and the case is to be considered in the 
light of the principle that the State is primarily the judge 
of regulations in the interest of public safety and welfare. 
We do not believe that Florida's statutory right of 
reply is lacking in any of the required standards of pre-
ciseness. The statute is sufficiently explicit to inform those 
who are subject to it as to what conduct on their part 
will render them liable to its penalties. 
We recognize that certainty is all the more essential 
when vagueness might induce individuals to forego their 
rights of speech, press and association for fear of violating 
an unclear law. Scull v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 344 (1959), 
Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 19·5 (1965). 
14Buck v. Gibbs, 34 F. Supp. 510, Mod. 313 U.S. 387 (1940); 
Hunter v. Owens, 80 Fla. 812, 86 So. 839 (1920); Cragin v. Ocean 4 
Lake Realty Co., 133 So. 569, 135 So. 795 (1931), appeal dism. 286 
U.S. 523; Haworth v. Chapman, 113 Fla. 591, 152 So. 663 (1933); 
Hanson v. State, 56 So.2d 129 (1952) ; Overstreet v. Blum, 227 So.2d 
197 (Fla. 1969) ; Hancock v. Sapp, 225 So.2d 411 (Fla. 1969) ; Rich v. 
Ryals, 212 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1968). 
App. 15 
' In Brock v. Hardie, 154 So. 690, 694 (1934), relative 
to the issue of vagueness, this Court said, 
"Whether the words of the Florida statute are 
sufficiently explicit to inform those who are 
subject to its provisions what conduct on their 
part will render them liable to its penalties is 
the test by which the statute must stand or fall, 
because, as was stated in the opinion above men-
tioned, 'a statute which either forbids or requires 
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of 
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its 
meaning and differ as to its application violates 
the first essential of due process of law.' 
"Such seems to be the test approved by the Su-
preme Court of the United States. Citation of 
authorities as to what may be considered the 
exact meaning of the phrase 'so vague that men 
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at 
its meaning,' so that certain conduct may be con-
sidered within or outside the true meaning of 
that phrase, or what language of a statute may 
lie within or without it, would be of little aid 
to us. 
"We must apply our own knowledge with which 
observation and experience have supplied us in 
determining whether words employed by the 
statute are reasonably clear or nor (sic) in indi-
cating the legislative purpose, so that a person 
who may be liable to the penalties of the act may 
know that he is within its provisions or not." 
App. 16 
Inter alia, appellee attacks the constitutionality of 
the statute on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth be-
cause of the use of the term "any"-referring to the type 
of reply allowable. This statute provides in part, 
"if any newspaper in its columns assails the per-
sonal character of any candidate for nomination 
or for election in any election, or charges said 
candidate with malfeasance or misfeasance in of-
fice, or otherwise attacks his official record, or 
gives to another free space for such purpose, such 
newspaper shall upon request of such candidate 
immediately publish free of cost any reply he may 
make thereto in as conspicuous a place and in the 
same kind of type as the matter that calls for 
such reply .... " [Emphasis Supplied] 
Because of the longstanding policy of this Court to give 
a statute, if reasonably possible, a construction supporting 
its constitutionality, we hold that the mandate of the 
statute refers to "any reply" which is wholly responsive 
to the charge made in the editorial or other article in a 
newspaper being replied to and further that such reply 
will be neither libelous nor slanderous of the publication 
nor anyone else, nor vulgar nor profane. 
We conclude that the statute in question is as certain 
and definite as others heretofore upheld as constitutionally 
permissible. The following statement made by Judge Tamm 
in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C., supra, 381 F.2d 
at 921, is clearly applicable to the instant cause: "Here 
there is no broad-reaching, all-embracive statutory provi-




' ' Although apparently not raised before the trial court, 
tl)e brief of Amicus Times Publishing Co. has raised the 
issue that Florida Statute 104.38 is a deprivation of prop-
erty right without due process. With this contention, we 
can not agree. Florida Statute 104.38 is a valid exercise 
of the state police power enacted to assure the integrity 
of the electoral process. In Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 
(1928), the Supreme Court stated, 
"And where the public interest is involved pre-
ferment of that interest over the property inter-
est of the individual, to extent even of its destruc-
tion, is one of the distinguishing characteristics 
of every exercise of police power which affects 
property." Id. at 279, 280. 
We find this argument of deprivation of property rights 
by being required to furnish free space to be without 
merit. See Miller v. Schoene, supra; Marsh v. Alabama, 
326 U.S. 501, at 506; Red Lion Broadcasting v. F. C. C., 
supra; Rosenbloom v. M etromedia, supra; Chronicle Pub-
lishing Co. v. Attorney General, 94 N.H. 148, 48 A.2d 478 
(1946); Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley 
Plaz·a, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968). 
In conclusion, we do not find that the operation of 
the statute would interfere with freedom of the press as 
guaranteed by the Florida Constitution and the Constitu-
tion of the United States. Indeed it strengthens the con-
cept in that it presents both views leaving the reader the 
freedom to reach his own conclusion. This decision will 
encourage rather than impede the wide open and robust 
dissemination of ideas and counterthought which the con-
cept of free press both fosters and protects and which is 
essential to intelligent self government. 
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Newspapers are not wholly dependent on electronic 
nedia as were the broadcasters in Red Lion Broadcasting 
7o. v. F. C. C., supra. However, we have no difficulty in 
;aking judicial notice that the publishers of newspapers 
ln this contemporary era would perish without this vital 
3ource of communications. The dissemination of news other 
than purely local is transmitted over telegraph wires or 
over air waves. This not only includes dissemination of 
news but also in chain newspaper operations so prevalent 
today, the Miami Herald being one; even editorials are 
prepared in one place and transmitted electronically to 
another. Therefore, the principles of law enunciated in 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C., supra, have been 
taken into consideration in reaching our opinion. 
A half free press would be deceptive to the public. 
Florida Statute 104.38, in the interest of all the people, 
provides that candidates for public office under certain 
prescribed circumstances shall have a right of reply, a 
right of expression. It does not deny to the owner of the 
instruments of the newspaper industry any right of ex-
pression. The statute assures, and does not abridge, the 
right of expression which the First Amendment guaran-
tees. The statute supports the freedom of the press in its 
true meaning-that is, the right of the reader to the whole 
story, rather than half of it--and without which the 
reader would be "blacked out" as to the other side of the 
controversy. 
For the foregoing reasons, we find Florida Statute 
104.38 to be constitutional and reverse the holding of the 
trial court that it is unconstitutional. 
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' Accord~~gly, the judgment of the trial court is re-
versed and this cause is remanded to the trial court for 
further proceedings not inconsistent herewith. 
It is so ordered. 
CARLTON, C.J., ADKINS, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., 
and RAWLS, District Court Judge, Concur 
ROBERTS, J., Concurs Specially with Opinion 
BOyD, J~1 Dis~ents with Q.Qiillim 
ROBERTS, J., Specially Concurring: 
I concur in the opinion and judgment of the majority. 
We are fully cognizant of the recent decision rendered by 
the Supreme Court of the United States in Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Com-
mittee, --U.S.--, 41 U.S.L.W. 4688, decided May 29, 
1973, which holds that neither the Federal Communica-
tions Act nor the First Amendment require broadcasters 
to accept paid editorial advertisements. But this opinion 
in no way derogated the earlier opinion of that court in 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969), 
validating the fairness doctrine of the Federal Communi-
cations Commission which imposes two affirmative re-
sponsibilities on the broadcaster-coverage of issues must 
be adequate and must fairly reflect differing viewpoints. 
As the Supreme Court stated in Columbia Broadcasting, 
supra, "In fulfilling its Fairness Doctrine obligations, the 
broadcaster must provide free time for the presentation 
of opposing views if a paid sponsor is unavailable, . . . 
and must initiate programming on public issues if no one 
else seeks to do so. 'See John J. Dempsey, 6 P & F Radio 
Reg. 615 (1950); Red Lion, supra, 395 U.S., at 378." 
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The complaints filed in Columbia Broadcasting, supra, 
by the Democratic National Committee and the Business 
Executives Move for Vietnam Peace, alleged that a broad-
caster had violated the First Amendment by refusing to 
sell it time to broadcast spot announcements expressing 
political views of the different groups. The Supreme Court 
turned its decision primarily on the limited nature of the 
broadcasting airwaves and the existence of the Fairness 
Doctrine which requires broadcasters to provide free time 
for presentation of opposing political views when a paid 
sponsor is not available. The decision in Columbia Broad-
casting is directed solely to the peculiar and limited nature 
of broadcasting frequencies, and that decision is not ap-
plicable to the instant facts presently before this Court in 
the case sub judice. Chief Justice Burger commences the 
body of his opinion with the following remarks: 
"Mr. Justice White's opinion for the Court in 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 
367 (1969), makes clear that the broadcast media 
pose unique and special problems not present in 
the traditional free speech case. Unlike other 
media, broadcasting is subject to an inherent 
physical limitation. Broadcast frequencies are a 
scarce resource; they must be portioned out 
among applicants. All who possess the financial 
resources and the desire to communicate by tele-
vision or radio cannot be satisfactorily accom-
modated. The Court spoke to this reality when, 
in Red Lion, we said 'it is idle to posit an un-
abridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast 
comparable to the right of every individual to 
speak, write, or publish.' Red Lion, supra, 395 
U.S., at 388. 
' 
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"Because the broadcast media utilize a valuable 
and limited public resource, there is also present 
an unusual order of First Amendment values. 
Red Lion discussed at length the application of 
the First Amendment to the broadcast media. 
In analyzing the broadcasters' claim that the 
Fairness Doctrine and two of its component rules 
violated their freedom of expression, we held that 
'[n] o one has a First Amendment right to a 
license or to monopolize a radio frequency; to 
deny a station license because 'the public inter-
est' requires it 'is not a denial of free speech." 
Red Lion, supra, 395 U.S., at 389. Although the 
broadcaster is not without protection under the 
First Amendment, United States v. Paramount 
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948), '[i]t 
is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the 
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount .... 
It is the right of the public to receive suitable 
access to social, political, esthetic, moral and 
other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. 
That right may not constitutionally be abridged 
either by Congress or by the FCC.' Red Lion, 
supra, 395 U.S., at 390." 
After recounting the history of broadcast regulations, the 
court in Columbia Broadcasting, supra, opined that broad-
casters are charged with the duty of providing the listen-
ing and viewing public with access to a balanced presen-
tation of information on issues of public importance. The 
Supreme Court was particularly concerned with forcing 
broadcasters to accept paid political advertisements when 
broadcasting frequencies are so limited because of a sub-
stantial risk that such a system would be monopolized by 
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those who could and would pay the costs, and that a system 
so heavily weighted in favor of the financially affluent or 
those with access to wealth would in effect undermine the 
effective operation of the Fairness Doctrine. The views of 
the affluent would prevail since they would have it within 
their power to purchase time more frequently, and edi-
torial advertising could then be monopolized by those of 
one political persuasion. Those were the concerns of the 
Supreme Court in Columbia Broadcasting, supra, when it 
rendered its decision that broadcasters are not required to 
accept paid editorial advertisements regardless of the con-
tent thereof. 
Our opinion in the instant cause in no way conflicts 
with the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Columbia 
Broadcasting, supra. 
CARLTON, C.J., ADKINS, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., 
and RAWLS, District Court Judge, Concur 
BOYD, J., Dissenting: 
I respectfully dissent. 
This statute carries a penalty provision for violations 
thereof, and it therefore must be most strictly construed 
in favor of any person accused thereunder. The statute is 
so vague on its face as to raise doubts in the minds of 
those reading it as to the exact underlying legislative 
intent. 
There are no standards as to when a publisher must 
carry a reply. For example, the following are just some of 
the important questions left unanswered by this statute. 
' 
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Does the law include both news stories and editorial c 
ment? If a story mentions a "situation", but does 
mention the candidate by name, may he reply? When 
publisher knows his statements are true, must he pub 
a statement from the candidate which he knows to 
false? If the reply of the candidate libels other per s1 
must the publisher print it, and, if so, is the publi~ 
subject to liability for any resulting libel suit? If 
candidate's reply were to contain obscene language, wo 
the publisher still have to print it-and thereby im 
prosecution under our obscenity laws? 
The First Amendment to the Constitution of 
United States provides that, "Congress shall make 
law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of · 
press .... " Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution of 1 
State of Florida similarly provides: "No law shall 
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or 
the press." Since these constitutional provisions prohi' 
the government from limiting the right of the publishi 
press to publish news and comment editorially, it wot 
be equally unconstitutional for the government to com1 
a publisher to print a statement of any other person, 
persons, against that publisher's will. 
The majority opinion correctly observes that freedo 
of speech and freedom of the press carry the duty to spe:: 
the truth. And, of course, the constitutional rights of fre 
dam of speech and freedom of the press must be exercisE 
with appropriate regard to the provisions of our libel ar 
obscenity statutes. As in all other areas of public ar. 
private service, some errors will, from time to time, sure] 
occur. Yet, recognizing that the survival of a free pre~ 
is contingent upon the press fulfilling its duty to the ger 
App. 24 
eral public, the overwhelming majority of those in the 
publishing press comply with the highest of ethical 
standards. 
We are taught in the Bible that, "the truth will make 
you free". 1 
Free people can make proper decisions for their own 
self-government only when they are adequately informed 
by a free press. To the extent that government limits or 
adds to that which a publisher must distribute, freedom 
of speech and freedom of the press are thereby diminished. 
Almost everyone whose name has been carried fre-
quently in the news media has been offended, at one time 
or another, by stories or comments with which he dis-
agrees. This is part of the price one pays for success and 
notoriety. If there exists a problem in this state of affairs, 
the muzzling of a free press is not the solution to such 
problem. 
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ApJ 
Appellee, Miami Herald, by petition for rehe: 
strenuously argues that this Court's opinion overlook 
fact that §104.38, Florida Statutes, is a criminal st 
and that this Court is without power to rewrite or per 
plastic surgery on a criminal statute in an attempt to 
the statute's vagueness by writing a definition of "re 
Appellee then journeys upon numerous hypothetical iJ 
ries-What is a newspaper? What is an assault? Wh 
an equally "conspicuous place" ?-and then reasons 
these "obvious ambiguities" render the subject statw 
vague that same must be held unconstitutional. 
App. 26 
As was emphaticaJly stated in the opinion of this 
Court, the action underlying this cause before us is a civil 
action which was filed in the Circuit Court for the Eleventh 
Judicial Circuit seeking to require appellee to publish 
appellant's reply pursuant to Florida Statute 104.38 and 
for damages. No criminal penalty is sought in the case sub 
judice, and, therefore, the validity vel non of the criminal 
penalty is not here involved. We are not unmindful of the 
line of decisions from this Court and the Supreme Court of 
the United States requiring more specificity in statutory 
authorship to support a statute which imposes a criminal 
penalty. However, the language of our opinion clearly de-
fi~es what would constitute a wrongdoing. We take this 
opportunity to restate the following excerpt from our 
opinion: 
"It is a fundamental principle that this Court 
has the duty, if reasonably possible, consistent 
with protection of constitutional rights, to re-
solve all doubts as to the validity of a statute in 
favor of its constitutionality and if reasonably 
possible a statute should be construed so as not 
to conflict with the constitution.1 Courts are in-
clined to adopt that reasonable interpretation of 
a statute which removes it farthest from consti-
tutional infirmity. In Gitlow v. People of New 
York, 268 U.S. 652, the Supreme Court of the 
United States stated every presumption is to be 
- --- --
1Buck v. Gibbs, 34 F.Supp. 510, Mod. 313 U.S. 387 (1940) ; 
Hunter v. Owens, 80 Fla. 812, 86 So. 839 (1920); Cragin v. Ocean & 
Lake Realty Co., 133 So. 569, 135 So. 795 ( 1931) , appeal dism. 286 
U.S. 523; Haworth v. Chapmen, 113 Fla. 591, 152 So. 663 (1933); 
Hanson v. State, 56 So.2d 129 (1952) ; Overstreet v. Blum, 227 So.2d 
197 (Fla. 1969) ; Hancock v. Sapp, 225 So.2d 411 (Fla. 1969) ; Rich 
v. Ryals, 212 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1968) . 
' 
App. 27 
indulged in favor of the validity of a statute, and 
the case is to be considered in the light of the 
principle that the State is primarily the judge of 
regulations in the interest of public safety and 
welfare." 
Even had this Court found the statute, the constitu-
tionality vel non which is being questioned sub judice, not 
to be sufficiently definite and specific to support a crim-
inal penalty, this criminal penalty provision would not be 
fatal to the statute because the statute is so constructed 
that the criminal penalty can be easily severed and deleted 
and still leave a complete legislative expression establish-
ing a civil right to damages. This Court has long held that 
where certain clauses, provisions, or sections of a statutory 
enactment are in violation of constitutional mandates, it 
does not necessarily follow that the whole enactment should 
fail, and this Court has held that the Court may sever the 
unconstitutional provision and uphold the remainder if 
that which is left is complete in itself, sensible, and capable 
of being executed, whether or not the enactment contains 
a severability clause. State ex rel. Boyd v. Deal, 24 Fla. 
293, 4 So. 899 (1888), Gwynn v. Hardee, 92, Fla. 543, 110 
So. 343 (1926); Lo-uis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 149 So. 8 
(Fla. 1933); City of Daytona Beach v. Harvey, 48 So.2d 
924 (Fla. 1950); Youngblood v. Darby, 58 So.2d 315 (Fla. 
1952) ; Harris v. Bryan, 89 So.2d 601 (Fla. 1956); Cramp 
v. The Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, 137 
So.2d 828 (Fla. 1962); Davis v. State, 146 So.2d 892 (Fla. 
1962) ; Musleh v. Marion County, 200 So.2d 168 (Fla. 
1967) ; Small v. Sun Oil Company, 222 So.2d 196 (Fla. 
1969). In State v. Newell, 85 So.2d 124 (Fla. 1956), this 
Court opined: 
.fi _l.l _l.l. .(,O 
"We have held that it is not always necessary to 
declare an entire Act invalid where a portion 
thereof is unconstitutional simply because the Act 
does not contain a severability clause. State v. 
Calhoun County, 126 Fla. 376, 170 So. 883, 886, 
and cases therein cited. The test is whether this 
court can say that the Legislature would not have 
enacted the law under scrutiny except for the 
provision which is herein held unconstitutional 
and invalid." 
A comparable statute to Florida Statute 104.38 requir-
ing a full and fair correction, apology, and retraction to 
be published in the same editions or corresponding issues 
of the periodical in which said article appeared, and in as 
conspicuous place and type as was said original article/ 
as an abatement of the publisher's liability for punitive 
damages, was held constitutional by this Court in Ross v. 
Gore, 48 So.2d 412 (Fla. 1950). Courts have generally 
regarded this type of statute to be in aid of a free press. 
We take judicial notice that this statute has been fre-
quently used to avoid punitive damages apparently with 
no adverse effect to newspaper publishers. But, indeed, 
this statute has been utilized to their financial advantage. 
Zflorida Statute 770.02 provides: 
"If it appears upon the trial that said article was published 
in good faith, that its falsity was due to an honest mistake 
of the facts, and that there were reasonable grounds for be-
lieving that the statements in said article were true, and that 
within ten days after the service of said notice a full and 
fair correction, apology and retraction was published in the 
same editions or corresponding issues of the newspaper or 
periodical in which said article appeared, and in as con-
spicuous place and type as was said original article, then the 
plaintiff in such case shall recover only actual damages." 
.n.pp .... " 
We also here note another retraction statute promul-
gated. by the Florida Legislature which defines a procedure 
for ~batement of criminal penalty. Florida Statute 836.08 
provides: 
"Correction, apology, or retraction by newspaper. 
-If it appears upon the trial that said article 
was published in good faith, that its falsity was 
due to an honest mistake of the facts, and that 
there were reasonable grounds for believing that 
the statements in said article were true, and that 
within ten days after the service of said notice a 
full and fair correction, apology and retraction 
was published in the same editions or correspond-
ing issues of the newspaper or periodical in which 
said article appeared, and in as conspicuous place 
and type as was said original article, then any 
criminal proceeding charging libel based on an 
article so retracted, shall be discontinued and 
barred." 
Reverting to the hypothetical inquiries posed by appel-
lee, it is observed that similar questions might well be 
posed as to the vagueness of certain provisions of Florida 
Statute 770.02, viz: "good faith"; "falsity"; "a full and 
fair correction"; "apology"; "conspicuous place"; and 
Florida Statute 836.08, viz: "correction"; "apology"; "rea-
sonable grounds"; or "a full and fair correction". In short, 
the definition and meaning of specific words or phrases 
in a particular factual situation have been and will be an 
infinite subject of inquiry so long as Homo sapiens engage 
in the art of communication. At this stage of the instant 
controversy, we are confronted not with the wisdom of the 
Legislature in enacting the challenged statutory provision; 
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our task is to preserve the prerogative of the legislative 
body unless it clearly contravenes the basic federal and 
state charters adopted by our citizenry. 
In conclusion, it must be remembered that First 
Amendment Freedom of the Press is for the benefit of all 
the people and not just those who have invested money in 
the publishing business. 
The petition for rehearing is denied. 
CARLTON, C.J., ROBERTS, ADKINS, McCAIN and 
DEKLE, JJ., and RAWLS, District Court Judge, Concur 




TORNILLO v. MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING CO. 
No. 72-20199. 
Circuit Court, Dade County. 
October 20, 1972. 
38 Fla. Supp 80 
FRANCIS J. CHRISTIE, Circuit Judge. 
Final judgment: Plaintiff, a candidate for the state 
legislature, demanded that the Miami Herald print ver-
batim his replies to two editorials in the Herald relating 
to his candidacy for public office. The Herald refused. 
Plaintiff then brought this action for a mandatory 
injunction and for damages seeking to enforce §104.38, 
Florida Statutes, by a civil action. The editorials and plain-
tiff's replies are attached to the complaint. In view of the 
nature of the relief requested the court granted plaintiff's 
request for an emergency hearing on October 2, 1972. 
Pursuant to §86.091, Florida Statutes, the attorney 
general was advised that the defendant intended to ask the 
court for a declaration that §104.38 was unconstitutional. 
The attorney general was served with a copy of the com-
plaint and was represented at the hearing. 
§104.38 is a criminal statute. Absent special circum-
stances equity will not enjoin the commission of a crime. 
Pompano Horse Club Co. v. State (1927), 93 Fla. 415, 111 
So. 801, 52 A.L.R. 51; 17 Florida Jurisprudence, Injunc-
tions, §46. 
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However, there is a more serious infirmity in plain-
tiff's case. The court is of the opinion that §104.38 violates 
Article I, § §4 and 9 of the Florida Constitution and the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution. 
This question was considered in State v. News-Journal 
Corporation, 36 Fla. Supp. 164, a case filed in the county 
judge's court of Volusia County, Florida. In a carefully 
reasoned opinion dated February 14, 1972, Judge J. Robert 
Durden held §104.38 unconstitutional on two grounds-an 
infringement upon freedom of the press, and a denial of 
due process of law because the statute is too vague, indef-
inite and uncertain to constitute notice of what language 
may fall within its purview and what constitutes a reply 
which must be printed. The attorney general advised the 
court that he had elected not to appeal Judge Durden's 
decision on the ground that he also had the same reserva-
tions about the constitutionality of the statute. 
This court concurs in Judge Durden's opinion. State 
statutes prohibiting or directing any type of publication, 
particularly upon pain of criminal sanction, are presumed 
unconstitutional unless it can be demonstrated that the 
infringement can be justified as required to protect a sub-
stantial public interest threatened by a clear and present 
danger. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Thomas 
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); Palko v. Connecticut, 
302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). The "priority" given First 
Amendment freedoms "gives these liberties a sanctity and 
a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." Thomas v. 
Collins, supra at page 530. "Because First Amendment 
freedoms need breathing space to survive, government 
may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity." 
N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). The First 
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Amendment prohibits the government from restraining 
the publication even of top secret documents alleged to be 
" vital to the national security. New York Times Co. v. 
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
Clearly if the state may not prohibit what a newspaper 
may print it cannot assume the editorial function and 
direct a newspaper what to print. By the First Amend-
ment, "The Government's power to censor the press was 
abolished so that the press would remain forever free to 
censure the Government. The press was protected so that 
it could bare the secrets of government and inform the 
people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively 
expose deception in government." New York Times Co. v. 
United States, supra at page 717 (Justice Black concur-
ring) (1971). 
Since §104.38, Florida Statutes, so clearly reaches cases 
in which its restraint upon freedom of speech and press 
does not measure up to any permissible First Amendment 
standard the statute is void on its face. 
Because of its broad intrusion into the area protected 
by the First Amendment, §104.38 also suffers from an 
additional infirmity-it is impermissibly vague and indef-
inite and this vagueness serves to restrict and stifle pro-
tected expression. No editor could know from the statute 
exactly what words would offend the statute or the scope 
of the reply intended to be mandated. A state may not enact 
such a broad statute and leave it to the courts, on a case 
by case basis, to determine the constitutionality of its appli-
cation to various circumstances. To do so places a citizen 
in an untenable position of foregoing his protected liber-
App. 34 
ties, or risking criminal prosecution. This dilemma itself 
impermissibly restricts· free expression. Smith v. Cahoon, 
283 u.s. 564 (1931). 
"Vague laws in any area suffer a constitu-
tional infirmity. When First Amendment rights 
are involved, we look even more closely lest, under 
the guise of regulating conduct that is reachable 
by the police power, freedom of speech or of the 
press suffer." Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 
200 (1966). 
The strict standards of overbreadth and vagueness in 
First Amendment cases are even stricter where a statute 
provides criminal sanctions. "The standard for certainty 
in statutes punishing for offenses is higher than in those 
depending primarily upon civil sanctions for enforcement." 
Winters v. New York, supra at page ·515. 
The attorney general advised the court at the bearing 
(sic) that his opinion as to the unconstitutionality of this 
statute had not changed since State v. News-Journal Cor-
poration, supra, and therefore he did not elect to intervene 
to defend the statute. 
Plaintiff stated that if the court found the statute on 
which this suit is based unconstitutional he did not desire 
to take further proceedings in this court and requested that 
his suit be dismissed with prejudice. 
Accordingly, confirming the court's oral ruling made 
at the conclusion of the hearing, this cause is dismissed 
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The following words and phrases when used in this 
code shall be construed: 
( 1) "Primary election" means election held preced-
ing the general election, for the purpose of nominating a 
party nominee to be voted for in the general election to 
fill a national, state or county office. The first primary 
is a nomination or elimination election, the second primary 
is a nominating election only. 
( 2) "Special primary election" is a special called 
nomination election designated by the governor, for the 
purpose of nominating a party nominee to be voted on in 
a general or special general election. 
( 3) "General election" means an election held on the 
first Tuesday after the first Monday in November in the 
even numbered years, for the purpose of filling national, 
state and county offices and for voting on constitutional 
amendments as proposed by the legislature. 
( 4) "Special general election" is a special called elec-
tion for the purpose of voting on a party nominee to fill a 
vacancy in the national, state or county office. 
* * * * 
(18) "Candidate" shall mean any person who has 
filed his qualification papers, and paid his qualifying fees 
as required by law. 
• 
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770.02 Correction, apology, or retraction by newspaper 
If it appears upon the trial that said article was 
published in good faith, that its falsity was due to an 
honest mistake of the facts, and that there were reasonable 
grounds for believing that the statements in said article 
were true, and that within ten days after the service of 
said notice a full and fair correction, apology and retrac-
tion was published in the same editions or corresponding 
issues of the newspaper or periodical in which said article 
appeared, and in as conspicuous place and type as was said 
original article, then the plaintiff in such case shall recover 
only actual damages. 
775.082 Penalties for felonies and misdemeanors 
* * * * 
(5) A person who has been convicted of a designated 
misdemeanor may be sentenced as follows: 
(a) For a misdemeanor of the first degree, by a 
definite term of imprisonment in the county jail not ex-
ceeding 1 year; 
(b) For a misdemeanor of the second degree, by a 
definite term of imprisonment in the county jail not ex-
ceeding 60 days. 
( 6) Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
alter the operation of any statute of this state authorizing 
a trial court, in its discretion, to impose a sentence of 
imprisonment for an indeterminate period within minimum 
and maximum limits as provided by law. 
" 
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775.083 Fine in lieu of or in addition to other criminal 
penalty 
A person who has been convicted of a crime, oth 
than a capital felony, may be sentenced, when specifical 
designated by statute, to pay a fine in lieu of or in adc 
tion to any punishment described in § 775.082. Fines f , 
designated crimes shall not exceed: 
(1) $10,000, when the conviction is of a felony 
the first or second degree ; 
(2) $5,000, when the conviction is of a felony of tl 
third degree; 
(3) $1,000, when the conviction is of a misdemean1 
of the first degree; 
(4) $500, when the conviction is of a misdemean1 
of the second degree; 
( 5) Any higher amount equal to double the pecuniaJ 
gain derived from the offense by the offender or daub 
the pecuniary loss suffered by the victim. 





THE MIAMI HERALD 
September 20, 1972 
The State's Laws And Pat Tornillo 
LOOK who's upholding the law! 
Pat Tornillo, boss of the Classroom Teachers Associa-
tion and candidate for the State Legislature in the Oct. 3 
runoff election, has denounced his opponent as lacking "the 
knowledge to be a legislator, as evidenced by his failure 
to file a list of contributions to and expenditures of his 
campaign as required by law." 
Czar Tornillo calls "violation of this law inexcusable." 
This is the same Pat Tornillo who led the CTA strike 
from February 19 to March 11, 1968, against the school 
children and taxpayers of Dade County. Call it whatever 
you will, it was an illegal act against the public interest 
and clearly prohibited by the statutes. 
We cannot say it would be illegal but certainly it 
would be inexcusable of the voters if they sent Pat Tornillo 
to Tallahassee to occupy the seat for District 103 in the 




THE MIAMI HERALD 
September 29, 1972 
FROM the people who brought you this-the teacher 
strike of '68-come now instructions on how to vote for 
responsible government, i.e., against Crutcher Harrison 
and Ethel Beckham, for Pat Tornillo. The tracts and 
blurbs and bumper stickers pile up daily in teachers' 
school mailboxes amidst continuing pouts that the School 
Board should be delivering all this at your expense. The 
screeds say the strike is not an issue. We say maybe it 
wouldn't be were it not a part of a continuation of disre-
gard of any and all laws the CTA might find aggravating. 
Whether in defiance of zoning laws at CTA Towers, con-
tracts and laws during the strike, or more recently state 
prohibitions against soliciting campaign funds amongst 
teachers, CTA says fie and try and sue us-what's good 
for CTA is good for CTA and that is natural law. Tor-
nillo's law, maybe. For years now he has been kicking the 
public shin to call attention to his shakedown statesman-
ship. He and whichever acerbic prexy is in alleged office 
have always felt their private ventures so chock-full of 
public weal that we should leap at the chance to nab the 
tab, be it half the Glorious Leader's salary or the dues 
checkoff or anything else except perhaps mileage on the 
staff hydrofoil. Give him public office, says Pat, and he 
will no doubt live by the Golden Rule. Our translation 
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Pat L. Tornillo, Jr., 
CTA Executive Director, 
and Candidate (Dem.) for 
State Rep., Dist. 103 
1809 Brickell A venue 
Miami, Florida 33129 
Phone: 854-0220 
September 30, 1972 
EDITORIAL REPLY 
Since the Herald has chosen to publicly attack my 
record, accomplishments, and positions on various issues, 
and those of the CTA, I again request that under Florida 
Statue 104.38, the Herald print the following record of 
affirmative and legal action. 
In 1968, CTA signed a no-strike affidavit. 
In 1969, CTA filed and won a suit in the Supreme 
Court of Florida, which gives all public employees the right 
to bargain collectively without the right to strike. 
In 1971, CTA filed the Tornillo suit, which enabled 
the School Board to receive $7.6 million and are presently 
cooperating with the Board in their effort to retain this 
money and avoid further financial chaos. 
Since 1968, CTA has reimbursed the taxpayers of 
Dade County for the full salary and all fringe benefits of 
its president. 
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Since 1970, CTA has not used the school mail service 
to communicate with its members. 
Since 1970, CTA has paid all costs of payroll deduc-
tion of dues for its members. 
We have attempted to obey all the laws of the state, 
not intentionally violating any, while continuing our ef-
forts to alert the public to the impending financial crisis 
facing the schools. 
We have, however, also retained our belief in the 
right of public employees to engage in political activity 
and to support the candidates of our choice, as is the right 
of any citizen in this great country of ours. 
Aye, there's the rub. 
* * * * 
TABLE 
Opinion of the J U8i 
298 N.E.2d 82! 





205 Misc. 982, 
Resident Participat 
322 F. Supp. 1 
Red Lion Broadcas 
395 u.s. 367 (: 
Rosenbloom v. Met~ 
403 u.s. 29 (1 
Shuck v. Carroll I 
215 Iowa 1276 
' "' 
State v. 'N ews-J ou: 
36 Fla. Supp. 1 
Ct. 1972) ----···· 
Terminello v. Chicc 


















STATE v. NEWS-JOURNAL CORPORATION. 
Docket 64, Page 2438. 
County Judge's Court, Volusia County. 
February 14, 1972. 
36 Fla.Supp. 164 
ROBERT DURDEN, County Judge. 
This cause came on to be heard on defendant's motion 
to dismiss on January 21, 1972. At said hearing, the court 
received a stipulated statement of facts and heard argu-
ment by the Volusia County Prosecutor and counsel for 
defendant. 
Stipulated facts 
The News-Journal Corporation is a Florida Corpora-
tion which publishes the Daytona Beach Morning Journal, 
a daily newspaper published in Volusia County. On Sep-
tember 29, 1971, there was published in the Daytona 
Beach Morning Journal a political article written by the 
News-Journal political editor, Ray Ruester, entitled Kane's 
City Hall Power Grab. The subject of the article was the 
incumbent mayor, Richard Kane, and his aUeged attempts 
to create a strong mayor government for the city which, 
by charter, has a commission manager form of government. 
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By a letter dated September 29, 1971, addressed to 
the editor, News-Journal Corporation, Richard Kane re-
quested that pursuant to §104.38, Florida Statutes, the 
News-Journal Corporation immediately publish a reply 
to the column. The material which Mayor Kane sought to 
have published as his reply was attached to his letter to 
the editor and consisted of an article written by Richard 
Kane and previously published in the Halifax Reporter, 
a newspaper published in Volusia County, on September 
4, 1971. 
The News-Journal Corporation refused to publish the 
material as requested. Mayor Kane thereafter signed an 
affidavit and caused a warrant to be issued for the News-
Journal Corporation for violation of § 104.38, Florida 
Statutes. 
The News-Journal Corporation filed its motion to 
dismiss contending, inter alia, that §104.38 is unconstitu-
tional under article 1, §4, of the constitution of Florida, 
and the first and fourteenth amendments to the constitu-
tion of the United States. 
Decision 
§104.38, Florida Statutes, provides as follows-
If any newspaper in its columns assails the 
personal character of any candidate for nomina-
tion or for election in any election, or charges 
said candidate with malfeasance or misfeasance 
in office, or otherwise attacks his official record, 
or gives to another free space for such purpose, 
such newspaper shall upon request of such candi-
' 
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date immediately publish free of costs any reply 
he may make thereto in as conspicuous a place 
and in the same kind of type as the matter that 
calls for such reply, provided such reply does not 
take up more space than the matter replied to. 
Any person or firm failing to comply with the 
provisions of this section shall, upon conviction, 
be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
The defendant in its motion to dismiss contends that 
the above-quoted statute is unconstitutional. This court 
agrees with the defendant for the reasons as stated herein. 
First, this court recognizes that the intent of the 
above-quoted statute is to regulate the press which is 
protected by the first amendment to the United States 
Constitution and article 1, §4, of the Florida Constitu-
tion. The cases limiting restraint of the free press are 
numerous. The case of the New York Times Company v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), is recognized as one of 
the landmark decisions in dealing with the question of 
freedom of the press. Mr. Justice Brennan, rendering the 
opinion of the court in that case, stated-
The general proposition that freedom of ex-
pression upon public questions is secured by the 
First Amendment has long been settled by our 
decisions. The constitutional safeguard we have 
said, "was fashioned to assure unfettered inter-
change of ideas for the bringing about of political 
and social changes desired by the people." Roth 
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 1 L.ed. 2d 
1498, 1506, 77 S.Ct. 1304. The maintenance of 
the opportunity for free political discussion to the 
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end that government may be responsive to the 
will of the people and that changes may be ob-
tained by lawful means, an opportunity essential 
to the security of the republic, is a fundamental 
principle of the constitutional system. 
Applying the rule of law as set forth therein it is 
the opinion of this court that the statute in question im-
poses an unconstitutional infringement upon the freedom 
of the press. 
Second, it should be recognized that the statute in 
question is a criminal statute, the violation of which is 
punishable by fine or imprisonment. It is a well settled 
rule of law of this state, and of all other states, that a 
criminal statute which either forbids or requires the doing 
of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelli-
gence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as 
to its application, violates the first essential of due process 
of law. Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange 
County, Florida, 368 U.S. 278; Aztec Motel, Inc. v. State, 
ex rel. Faircloth, 251 So.2d 849 (Florida Supreme Court, 
1971); Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1951). 
This court is of the opinion that the language of 
the statute in question is too vague, indefinite and un-
certain to constitute notice of what language may fall 
within the purview of the statute and what constitutes a 
reply which must be printed at the request of candidates. 
This court is of the opinion that this statute is not reason-
ably definite and certain and that the constitutional re-
quirement of definiteness is violated in that this statute 
fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice 
of its violation. 
RECEIVED 
NOV 1 9 197J' 
In The 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
SUPREME COURT, U.S. 
Supreme Court of the United States 
October Term, 1973 
The Miami Herald Publishing Company, a division 
of Knight Newspapers, Inc. 
Appellant, 
v. 
Pat L. Tornillo, Jr., 
Appellee. 
APPLICATION FOR STAY OF MANDATE OF SUPREME COURT 
OF FLORIDA 
To the Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court and Circuit Justice for the 
Fifth Circuit: 
Appellant, The Miami Herald Publishing Company, 
a division of Knight Newspapers, Inc. ("The Miami Herald"), 
is this day filing a Jurisdictional Statement in this case, 
a copy of which is attached to this Application. Appellant 
prays that an order be entered staying the mandate of the 
Supreme Court of Florida, which will otherwise issue on 
November 20, 1973, pending a final determination of the 
matter by this Court. In support of this Application, 
Appellant respectfully shows as follows: 
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1. Appellant is the publisher of a newspaper, 
The Miami Herald. On October 1, 1972, suit was instituted 
against The Miami Herald in the Circuit Court for Dade 
County, Florida, by Appellee Pat L. Tornillo ("Tornillo") 
to obtain a mandatory injunction directing The Miami Herald 
to print verbatim a statement by Appellee, and damages. 
Tornillo's cause of action was based on Section 104.38, Fla. 
Stat., a criminal statute, which makes it a misdemeanor 
.\ for a new~paper to refuse to publish "any reply" by a 
) political candidate to any matter critical of the candidate 
published in the newspaper. 
2. The Circuit Court for Dade County dismissed 
Tornillo's complaint, and in an opinion dated October 20, 
1972, held Section 104.38, Fla. Stat., to be in violation of 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Con-
stitution, a~d Article I of the Florida Constitution. On 
July 18, 1973, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed the 
judgment of the Circuit Court, and held that Section 104.38, 
Fla. Stat., "does not constitute a violation of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States 
or Article I, Section 4, Florida Constitution.") The Miami 
Herald filed a Petition for Rehearing, which was denied by the 
Supreme Court of Florida in an opinion dated October 10, 1973. 
Copies of these three opinions are included in the Appendix 
to the attached Jurisdictional Statement. 
3. On August 2, 1973, concurrently with the filing 
of its Petition for Rehearing,The Miami Herald petitioned the 
Supreme Court of Florida pursuant to Rule 3.15 of the Florida 
Appellate Rules for an extension of time for issuance of the 
Court's mandate and a stay of proceedings in the Florida courts, 
-2-
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should the Petition for Rehearing be denied. On _October 16, ) 
1973, the Supreme Court of Florida granted the petition and /· 
ordered proceedings to be stayed "to and including November \ 
19, 1973 to allow [Appellant] to seek review in the Supreme \ 
Court of the United States and obtain any further stay from 
that court." (Emphasis added) A copy of that Order is 
attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 
4. Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal with the 
Supreme Court of Florida on November 1, 1973. A copy of 
that Notice is included in the Appendix to the attached 
Jurisdictional Statement. 
5. This Court has jurisdiction to review this 
case pursuant to 28 u.s.c. §1257(2). Application for the 
stay is made pursuant to Rules 18, 50 and 51 of the Rules 
of this Court. 
6. Reasons for seeking appeal. A stay of mandate 
pending appellate review by this Court should be granted 
where the matters to be raised on appeal "are of such signif-
icance and difficulty that there is a }substantial prospect 
that they will command four votes for review 1 ,.. Organized 
Village of Lake v. Egan, 80 S.Ct. 33, 4 L.Ed.2d 34 (1959) 
(Opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan as Circuit Justice) and where 
the Court will ultimately have jurisdiction over the appeal, 
Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Company, 86 S.Ct. 1, 15 L.Ed.2d 
39 (1965) (Opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg as Circuit Justice). 
Appellant submits that the major issues to be raised on appeal 
~ present such substantial constitutional questions as to warrant 
l a stay under the foregoing standard~: 
-3-
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a. The unprecedented regulation of the press 
permitted by the opinion below is in violation of the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
As more fully discussed in the accompanying 
Jurisdictional Statement, the decision of the Florida Supreme 
Court upholding the constitutionality of Section 104.38, which 
requires a newspaper to publish the reply of any candidate in 
any state election who is criticized in matter printed in the 
newspaper, so basically conflicts with traditional concepts 
of freedom of speech and press as to constitute a form of 
censorship. Although this Court has never decided the -----. 
specific constitutional question of whether the government 
may command the private press to publish certain information 
and ideas, several lower Federal and State Courts have faced 
similar issues. The Florida Supreme Court's opinion in this 
case is in direct conflict with these cases. There is a 
likelihood of a substantial amount of fut~re litigation of 
the question since several states already have such statutes 
and at least one other state legislature has considered such 
a law in the past year. 
b. The decision below is in serious conflict 
with this Court's recent series of cases distinguishing the 
broadcast and other news media for purposes of government 
regulation. 
As discussed in the accompanying Jurisdictional 
Statement, the holding of the Florida Supreme Court that a 
form of the fairness doctrine may appropriately be applied 
to the printed media clearly conflicts with this Court's --
decision in Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 u.s. 367 
(1969) and in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic 
National Committee, u.s. __ , 36 L.Ed.2d 772 (1973). 
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In those cases, this Court took great pains to point out 
that any regulation of the broadcast media in terms of 
programming content could be justified only by reference 
to the physical and technological distinctions between the 
broadcast and printed media. In one stroke, the decision 
of the Florida Supreme Court would wipe away that distinction 
and permit unprecedented regulation of the press. Disregard-
ing this Court's denial of any right of guaranteed paid 
access to the broadcast media in Columbia Broadcasting, the 
decision below would fling open the doors to the pressroom 
by permitting free access to a newspaper's columns to any 
candidate criticized in the newspaper. 
7. Reasons stay should be granted. 
While the opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida announces 
a final determination of the issue of the constitutionality 
of Section 104.38, it also remands the cause to the trial 
court "for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith." 
Unless a stay is ordered by this Court, such proceedings may 
be commenced on or after November 20, 1973. The issues to 
be resolved in such proceedings could include the factual 
questions raised in the complaint and the measure of damages. 
If forced to defend such proceedings while prosecuting an 
appeal before this Court,~~pellant will_ suffer a _financial 
~e~al burden which is irreparable,! An ultimate decisi;n 
by this Court holding §104.38, Fla. Stat., unconstitutional 
could not restore th~ time and , expen~which The Miami Herald 
would have incurred in defending the action in the Florida 
courts. Furthermore, the courts of Florida would be burdened 
with the trial of a cause that may ultimatel~ be mooted by a 
decision from this Court. 
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While continued proceedings in the Florida courts 
will cause considerable harm to The Miami Herald and a 
possible unnecessary burden to the judicial system, Appellee 
will not suffer any damages if a stay is granted. Tornillo's . 
original prayer for an injunction and a retraction prior to 
the election of November, 1972 has long ago been mooted by the 
fact that the election has been held, and his only remaining 
claim is for damages. Tornillo will suffer no detriment from 
awaiting a final resolution of the question of constitutionality 
of Section 104.38 by this Court. 
The foregoing factors were recognized by the attached 
Order of the Supreme Court of Florida staying proceedings through 
November 19, 1973, which expressly contemplates this Court's 
granting a further stay in this case. 
WHEREFORE, Appellant prays that the judgment and 
mandate of the Supreme Court of Florida, which will otherwise 
issue on November 20, 1973, be stayed pending a final 
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Counsel for Appellant 
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PAT L. TORNILLO, JR., 
Appellant, 
vs. 
THE MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING 
COMPANY, a division of KNIGHT 
NEWSPAPERS I INC • I 
Appellee. 
IN THE SUP~~E COURT OF FLORIDA 
JULY TERM, A. D. 1973 
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1973 
** 
** 





Appellee's petition for ~xtension of time for issuance 
of mandate is granted and proceedings in this Court and in the 
lower courts are hereby stayed to and including November 19, 1973, 
to .allow appellee to seek review in the Supreme Court of the United 
States and obtain any further stay from that court. -. 
A True Copy 
TEST: 
~ .... 




cc: Honorable James W. Beasley 
Honorable Tobias Simon 
Honorable Robert L. Shevin 
Honorable Jonathan L. Alpert 
Honorable William c. Ballard 
Honorable Donald U. Sessions 
Honorable Richard P. Brinker 
EXHIBIT 1. 
~~ --·---
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing 
Application for Stay of Mandate of Supreme Court of Florida 
was served this 19th day of November, 1973 upon Mr. Tobias 
Simon, Attorney for Appellant, 1492 South Miami Avenue, 
Miami, Florida 33130, by personal delivery. 
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~u.prtmt <!Jrutrt o-f tlrt ~tb ~tmes 
Jfas!p:ttgLm. !9. <!f. 2ll~~.;l 
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
November 20, 1973 
SUBJECT: The Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, A-504 
(No. 73-797) (Application for Stay) 
IMMEDIATE SITUATION: A Florida Circuit Court held 
unconstitutional a Florida criminal statute which makes it a 
misdemeanor for a newspaper to refuse to publish a reply by a 
p olitical candidate to any matter critical of the candidate published 
in the newspaper. The Florida SC reversed and remanded the ca.se 
back to the trial court for trial on the complaint for injunction. Tn e 
SC stayed its mandate through November 19 (Monday) to allow applicant 
to seek review "and obtain any further stay" in this Court. 
FACTS: Respondent, who was a candidate for the state 
legislature, demanded that applicant rint verbatim his replies to 
two editorials relatmg to his can .idacy for public office. Applicant 
r~d and respondent filed compl aint t or declaratory and injunctive 
relief seeking to enforce by civil action Florida Statute 104. 38 which 
p rovides: 
§ 104. 38 News p aper assailing candidate in an 
election; space for reply. -- If any newsp aper in its 
columns as sails the personal cha~acter of any 
candidate for nomination or for election in any 
election, or chaf ges said candidate with malfeasance 
or misfeasance in office, O&S>~e attacks his 
o!§si~ --~~.rd, or gives to another free space for such 
purpose, such newspaper shall upon request of such 
candidate immediately publish free of cost any reply 
he may make thereto in as consp.cuous a place and 
in the same kind of type as the matter that calls for 
such reply, provided such reply does not take up 
more space than the matter replied to. Any person or 
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firm failing to comply with the provisions of this 
section shall be g~ilty of a misdemeanor of the 
first degree .... 
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the 
Florida statute was an unconstitutional infringement upon freedom of 
speech and press and because the statute was impermissibly vague and 
indefinite. 
The SC of Florida (Per Curiam; Boyd, diss.) reversed and 
remanded. On October 10, 1973, the Florida SC denied a rehearing. 
On October 16, the SC granted a stay of its mandate to and including 
November 19 to allow applicant to seek review before this Court and 
to 11 obtain any further stay from that court. 11 
Applicant filed the instant application and Jurisdictional Statement 
on November 19. 
RATIONALE OF THE FLORIDA SC: Recognizing that there is a 
right to publish without prior governmental restraint, the SC emphasized 
that there is a correlative responsibility that the public be fully informed 
and that the public 11need to know 11 is most critical during an election 
campaign. To these ends the court found that the Florida statute 
11 enhances 11 rather than abridges freedom of speech and press. 
The SC found the Florida statute designed to add to the flow of 
information and ideas and that it does not constitute an incursion upon 
First Amendment rights or a prior restraint, since no specified 
newspaper content is excluded. 
The SC noted a tendency towards monopolizationof the press and, 
' " citing Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), found that ' 
it is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited 
market place of ideas wherein truth will prevail rather than to countenance 
a monopolization of that market whether by government or private 
enterprise. 
In upholding the Florida 11 right-of-reply 11 statute, the SC noted 
this Court's reference to such statutes in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 
403 U.S. 29, 47, n. 15. 
The Florida SC also found the statute sufficiently explicit to 
inform those who are subject to it as to what conduct will render them 
liable to its penalties. 
- 3 -
CONTENTIONS OF APPLICANT: Noting that this Court has 
never ruled directly upon a state statute requiring newspaper publication 
of a reply, applicant argues that the decision below is in conflict with 
the rationale of this Court in such cases as Red Lion and Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 36 
L. Ed. 2d 772 ( 1973 ). 
Citing Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 
F. 2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971), applicant contends that the Florida SC erred 
in its apparent conclusion that regulations which affirmatively require 
publication somehow stand on a different constitutional footing than 
regulations prohibiting publication. 
Noting the Florida SC' s reliance on the constitutional recognition 
given the 11Fairness Doctrine 11 by this Court in Red Lion and Columbia 
Broadcasting, applicant urges that that doctrine can be sustained in 
those media only because of the unique characteristics of electronic 
communication. Citing Columbia Broadcasting, applicant argues that 
the state court erred in drawing an analogy between the broadcast and 
the print media. 
Applicant contends that the Florida statute represents an 
abridgement of a basic and vital constitutional protection provided 
to the press by the First Amendment, imposing governmental controls 
on editorial decisions to publish critical stories about political candidates. 
Citing numerous (6) ambiguities in the statute, applicant also 
argues that the statute's vagueness and ambiguity increases its un-
constitutional effect upon legitimate expression. 
Applicant states that if the Florida SC' s mandate is not stayed, 
; " proceedings in the trial court may commence on or after November 20 
and that it will suffer a financial and legal burden which is irreparable 
-- that an ultimate favorable decision by this Court could not restore 
the time and expense which applicant would have incurred in defending 
the action in the Florida courts. 
On the other hand, applicant argues that respondent 1 s original 
complaint for an injunction has been mooted by the fact that the election 
has been held, and his only remaining claim is for damages. 
Furthermore, applicant suggests that the Florida SC order 
staying its mandates through November 19 expressly contemplates 
this Court's granting a further stay in this case. 
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DISCUSSION: This case appears to be an important one of 
first impression before the Court and one the Court may well want to hear. 
The constitutionality of the "fairness doctrine" as applied in 
the broadcast media has been recognized, and some of its limitations 
established, by this Court. Although the Court• s dicta would suggest 
that a similar doctrine would be inapplicable to the press, or, at 
least its limitations more constricted, the question apparently is not 
free from doubt. In this regard, it is noted that in Rosen bloom the 
Court specifically noted that state right-of-reply statutes were a possible 
solution to the fear that private citizens will not be able to respond 
adequately to publicity involving them. 403 U.S. at 47. While the 
reference may be read narrowly in the factual context of thfll-t case, 
the footnote cited a law review note advocating a right to reply for 
political candidates. Note, Vindication of the Reputation of a Public 
Official, 80 Har. L. Rev. 1730, 1745-~n any event, it would appear 
doubtful whether this Court would ~e~esant 'a crim"nal right-to-reply 
statute such as the one here. 
It should be noted that the .1\t..torney ~~1 of Florida has 
indicated in another case involving the same statute that he has 
reservations about its constitutionality. Opinion of Circuit Court, 
J. S. at App. 32. He also joined applicant on the petition for rehearing 
urging the Florida SC to grant the petition and reverse its initial decision. 
Applicant does not make a strong case for irreparable injury. 
Granting a stay on the alleged injuries of time and expense involved 
in lower court litigation may establish a bad precedent. On the other 
hand, however, it J!_o~ot ~ppear that respondent would suffer any injury 
~----- ........... ~ -- -if a stay is granted. 
~
RECOMMENDATION: This case appears to be significant. You 
may wish to refer it to the Conference. 
Balancing the "equities" involved, I am inclined to think that the 
stay should be granted. However, there seems to be no immediate 




s out of my bailiwick, it would appear appropriate 
to call for a response to the J. S. from the Florida AG. 
~~ 
James B • .,...G:-; { 
C HAMSERS OF 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POW ELL, JR 
jtlt.Jrrttnt OJ c-urt cf tlTt ~~~ .ita±te 
'~fhtsfringtc-n, ~- OJ. 2.0~,~~ 
November 20, 1973 
A-504 The Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I am sending to each of you with this Memorandum: 
(i) Application for Stay of Mandate in the above case; 
(ii) Jurisdictional statement filed on behalf of the applicant; 
(iii) Memorandum of November 20 from Jim Ginty which 
summarizes the facts, decision of the Florida Supreme Court, and the 
contentions of the applicant. 
Mter conferring with the Chief Justice, I have today signed an 
Order in my capacity as Circuit Justice staying the application pending 
further order of this Court. In view of the importance of the issue, I 
am referring the application to the Court for consideration at our ; " 
Conference on November 30. 
Sincerely, 
LFPjr/ gg 
( ( ' I '- . 
l 
November 20, 1973 
A-504 The Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I am sending to each of you with this Memorandum: 
(i) Application for Stay of Mandate in the above ease; 
(ii) Jurisdictional statement filed on behalf of the applicant; 
(iii) aemorandum of November 20 from Jim Ginty which 
summarizes the facts, decision of the Florida SUpreme Court, and the 
contentions of the applicant. 
Mter conferring with the Chief Justice, I have today signed an 
Order in my capacity as Circuit Justice staying the application pending 
further order of this Court. In view of the importance of the issue, I _ , 
am referring the application to the Court for consideration at our · 











A-504 (No. 73-797) The Miami Herald 
Pobliehing Co. v. Tornillo 
The attached application for a stay of IIWldate has been filed 
with me as Circuit Justice. .-t,. 
The Florida Supreme Court stayed its mandate through today 
to allow an application to be made to us. Thus, I am inclined to aet 
today unless you think otherwise. Also, I am inclined to grant a stay 
pending action Ill the application by the full Court (at our next 
Conference). As you will see from Jim Ginty's memo the case 
raises a major question of first impression. I am satisfied that 
there will be at least four votes to grant. 
I will call you early this afternoon to discuss this, if convenient 
with you. 





November ZO, 1973 
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
SUBJECT: The Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, A -504 
(No. 73-797) (Application for Stay) 
IMMEDIATE SITUATION: A Florida Circuit Court held 
unconstitutional a Florida criminal statute which makes it a 
misdemeanor for a newspaper to refuse to publish a reply by a 
political candidate to any matter critical of the candidate published 
in the newspaper. The Florida SC reversed and remanded the case 
ba<!k to the trial court for trial on the complaint for injunction. The 
SC stayed its mandate through November 19 ( onday) to allow applicant 
to seek review "and obtain any further stay" in this Court. 
FACTS: Rea_£Q.,nd~nt, who was a candidate for the state 
legislature, d~~that applicant pri~t verbati~ his repl~es to 
two editorials relating to his candidacy for public office. Applicant 
refused and res ondent filed com laint for declaratory and injunctive 
relief seekins to enforce by civil action Florida Statute 1 which 
provides: '::::: 
§ 104. 38 Newspaper assailing candidate in an 
election; space for reply. -- If any newspaper in its 
columns assails the personal character of any 
candidate for nomination or for election in any 
election, or cha ges said candidate with malfeasance 
or mitfeaaance in office., or otherwise atta.cks his 
official record, or gives to another free space for such 
purpose_. such newspaper shall upon request of such 
candidate immediately publish free of cost any reply 
he may make thereto in aa conap.cuous a place and 
in the same kind of type as the matter that calls for 
such reply, provided . such reply does not take up 
more space than the matter replied to. Any person or 
... z-
firm failing to comply with the provisions of thia 
section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the 
first degree • • • • 
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the 
Florida statute was an unconstitutional infringement upon freedom of 
speech and press and because the statute was impermissibly vague and 
indefinite. 
The SC of Florida (.!!!.! Curiam; Boyd, dies.) reversed and 
remanded. On October 10, 1973, the Florida SC denied a rehearing. 
On October 16, the SC granted a stay of ita mandate to and including 
November 19 to allow applicant to seek review before this Court and 
to "obtain any further stay from that court." 
Applicant filed the instant application and Jurisdictional Statement 
on November 19. 
RATIONALE OF THE FLORIDA SC: Recognizing that there is a 
right to publish without prior governmental restraint, the SC emphasiz.ed 
that there is a correlative responsibility that the public be fully informed 
and that the public "need to know" is most critical during an election 
campaign. To these ends the court found that the Florida statute 
"enhances" rather than abridges freedom of speech and press. 
The SC found the Florida statute designed to add to the flow of 
information and ideas and that it does not constitute an incursion upon 
First Amendment rights or a prior restraint; since no specified 
newspaper content is excluded. 
The SC noted a tendency towards monopolizationof the press and, _ _, 
citing Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969}, foupd that · 
it is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibit~d 
market place of ideas wherein truth will prevail rather than to countenance 
a monopolization of that market whether by government or private 
enterprise. I 
\ 
In upholding the Florida "right-of-reply" statute, 
this Court• a reference to such statutes in Rosenbloom v. 





Tlwt Florida SC abo found the statute sufficiently explicit to A 
inform those who are subject to it aa to what conduct will render them , 




. ' ..,. 
CONTENTIONS OF APPLICANT: Noting that this Court bas 
never ruled directly upon a atate statute requiring newspaper publication 
of a reply, applicant arguea that the decision below is in conflict with 
the rationale of this Court in such cases as Red Lion and Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 36 
L. Ed. Zd 77Z (197 3 ). 
Citing Aseociatee & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 
F. Zd 133 (9th Cir. 1971 ), applicant contends that the Florida SC erred 
in its apparent conclulion that regulations which affirmatively require 
publication somehow stand on a different conatitutional footing than 
regulations prohibiting publication. 
Noting the Florida SC1 a reliance on the conatitutional recognition 
given the "Fairness Doctrine" by this Court in Red Lion and Columbia 
Broadcasting, applicant urget that that doctrine can be euatained in 
thoee media only because of the unique characteristics of electronic 
communication. Citil'lg Columbia Broadcasting, applicant argue• that 
the state court erred in drawing a.a analogy between the broadcast and 
the print media. 
Applicant contends that the Florida statute represents an 
abridgement of a bade and vital conatitutional protection provided 
to the press by the First Amendment, imposing governmental controls 
on editorial decisions to publish critical stories about political candidates. 
Citing numerous (6) ambiguities in the statute. applicant also 
arguea that the atatute1 s vaguenees and ambiguity increa1es ita un-
constitutional effect upon legitimate expresaion. 
Applicant atates that if the Florida SC• e mandate is not stayed, ,.. 
proceedings in the trial court may commence on or after November ZO ; 
and that it will suffer a financial and legal burden which is irreparable 
... that an ultimate favorable decieion by this Court could not restore 
the time and expense which applicant would have incurred in defending 
the action in the Florida courta. 
On the other hand. applicant argues that reapondentt s original 
complaint for an injunction has been mooted by the fact that the election 
has been held,. and his only remaining daim i8 for damage1. 
Furthermore. applicant auggeata that the Florida SC order 
staying ita mandatee through November 19 expressly contemplates 
this Court•e granting a further atay in this caae. 
DISCUSSION: This case appears to be an important one of 
first impression before the Court and one the Court may well want to hear. 
The constitutionality of the "fairness doctrine" as applied in 
the broadcast media has been recognized, and some of its limitations 
established, by this Court. Although the Court• s !!!E!! would suggest 
that a similar doctrine would be inapplicable to the press, or, at 
least ite limitations more constricted, the question apparently ie not 
free from doubt. In this regard, it is noted that in Rosenbloom the 
Court specifically noted that state right .. of•reply statutes were a possible 
solution to the fear that private citizens will not be able to respond 
adequately to publicity involving them. 403 U.S. at 47. While the 
~+ 
reference may be read narrowly in the factual context of th case, 
the footnote cited a law review note advocating a right to reply for 
political candidates. Note, Vindication of the Reputation of a Public 
Official, 80 Har. L. Rev. 1730, 1745-47. In any event, it would appear 
doubtful whether this Court would consonant a criminal right .. to- reply 
statute such as the one here. 
It should be noted that the Attorney General of Florida has 
indicated in another case involving the same statute that he has 
reservations about its constitutionality. Opinion of Circuit Court, 
J. S. at App. 3Z. He also joined applicant on the petition for rehearing 
urging the Florida SC to grant the petition and reverse ita initial decision. 
Applicant does not make a strong case for irreparable injury. 
Granting a stay on the alleged injuries of time and expense involved 
in lower court litigation may establish a bad precedent. On the other 
hand. however, it doee not appear that respondent would suffer any injury 
if a stay is granted. 
RECOMMENDATION: This c:ate appears to be significant. You 
may wish to refer it to the Conference. 
Balancing the "equitiel 11 involved, I am inclined to think that the 
etay should be granted. However, there aeems to be no immediate 
danger of significant injury to applicant and you may wiah to call for 
a response. 
Although ita out of my bailiwick, it would appear appropriate 
to call for a response to the J. S .. from the Florida AG. 
James B. Ginty 
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DIVISION OF 
Appellee. 
. OF MANDATE OF SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA 
WHILE FLORIDA STATUTE §104.38 makes the newspaper 
I 
publisher's refusal to grant access for a reply a misdemeanor, 
the Plaintiff in this cause sought declaratory and injunctive 
relief and punitive damages only. The Supreme Court of Florida 
f 
held these ivil remedies ·were available to the Plaintiff under 
the statute and the applicable state law; indeed, it added that: 
"The criminal penalty can be easily severed 
and deleted and ' still leave complete legislative 
expression establishing a civil right to damages." 
(Order Denying Rehearing, Appendix to Juris-
dictional Statement, page 27) 
The complaint in this matter was filed two days before, 
and a hearing was held one day before, the 1972 primary elections 
for the State Legislature. THE MIAMI HERALD filed no answer or 
1 
other responsive pleading. Its defenses to the civil relief 
prayed for in the complaint, other than its assertion of the 
statute's invalidity under the First Amendment, if any, are still 
officially unstated. However, the Appellant's Brief filed in the 
Supreme Court of Florida suggests that the MIAMI HERALD is pro-
tecting its flanks with a number of subsidiary and independent 
1. The parties as well as the court below, treated the hearing as 
if a demurrer or motion to dismiss were pending. The trial judge, 
in fact, "dismissed" the suit "with prejudice''. On appeal, 
the Supreme Court of Florida reversed, stating "the cause is 
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings not incon-
sistent herewith." (Opinion of Florida Supreme Court, Appendix 
to Jurisdictional Statement, page 19.) 
-1-
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. ... 
factual defenses, quite separate from the sole constitutional 
question now before this Court. 2 
On page 26 of its Florida Supreme Court Brief, THE 
MIAMI HERALD candidly and forthrightly admits: 
"It is conceivable that some type of 'reply' 
1
( 
statute could be drafted which could meet ( 
the test of the First Amendment." 
And, assuming the existence of a statute, when appeals 
are exhausted it reserves the right to assert that the subject 
candidatorial attacks were not proscribed thereby; and if so, the 
statute would not compel publication of these particular responses 
because they are nonresponsive. THE MIAMI HERALD has not conceded 
the finality of the judgment affected by this appeal! Thus, from 
page 21 of the HERALD Brief: 
"--What kinds of publications give rise to a 
requirement of printing a reply? The statute 
provides right of reply when a newspaper makes 
a publication 'in its columns?' Does this mean 
any publication of any nature in a newspaper? 
Does it include news articles? Editorials? 
'Columns?' Advertisements? Letters to the 
Editor? Does it include only publications ori-
ginated by the newspaper or does it also include 
publication of articles from news syndicates, 
such as the Associated Press, or syndicated 
columns? 
--What is the nature of publications which give 
rise to a right of reply? The statute applies 
when a newspaper 'assails the personal character 
of a candidate ... or charges said candidate with 
malfeasance or misfeasance in office, or otherwise 
attacks his official record •.. ' Is an endorsement 
of one candidate an 'attack' on his opponent? Cf., 
Ex Parte Hawthorne, 116 Fla." 608, 156 So. 619, -
625 (1934) (concurring opinion of Justice Buford). 
Does the statute apply only if a candidate is 
libeled? Cf., Manasco v. Walley, supra. What 
is the 'personal character' of a person? Cf., 
2. Objections on vagueness grounds have been effectively overcome 
by the Florida Supreme Court's own gloss on the statute: 
"Because of the longstanding policy of this Court 
to give a statute, if reasonably possible, a con-
struction supporting its constitutionality, we 
hold that the mandate of the statute refers to 
'any reply' which is wholly responsive to the 
charge made in the editorial or other article in 
a newspaper being replied to and further that 
such reply will be neither libelous nor slander-
ous of the publication nor anyone else, nor vulgar 
nor profane." (Opinion of the Florida Supreme 
Court, Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement, pg. 16.) 
-2-
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Firestone v. Time, Inc., So.2d (Fla. 1972) 
Case No. 41,868). Is the statute invoked by a 
publication of an opinion or comment, or does it 
also come into play when a factual publication is 
made? Does the statute apply regardless of whether 
the factual matter is true or not? 
--To elections for what offices does the statute 
apply? Federal offices? State offices? County 
or municipal offices? 
--What type of reply is required to be published? 
Does the newspaper have the power to refuse to 
publish obscene or defamatory replies? Cf. 
Opinion of the Justices, supra, at 921. 
--Where must the reply be printed? The statute 
calls for publication of the reply in 'as conspi-
cuous a place' as the initial publication, but 
this standard is totally subjective. Is page four 
of a newspaper as 'conspicuous' a place as page 
five? Is the editorial page as 'conspicuous' a 
place as the front page? 
--How lengthy a reply must be published? If a 
newspaper prints a news article describing a 
gambling raid, and identifies a candidate as having 
been arrested, does the candidate have a right to 
a two or three word reply (in equal length to the 
number of words in his name) or a reply equal to 
the length of the entire article, even though the 
candidate may be mentioned only incidentally?" 
Appellee believes it is not without significance that 
in Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 16 L.Ed. 2d 484, 86 S.Ct. 1434, 
this Court held· a challenge to the Alabama State Corrupt Practices 
Act involving prosecution for publishing an editorial on election 
\ 
day as final (for the purposes of 28 u.s.c. 1257) although no 
trial had taken place below. The reason for the finality is that 
this Court found that the Alabama Supreme Court had rendered a 
judgment binding upon the trial court "that it must convict Mills 
under this state statute if he wrote and published the editorial." 
Mills conceded that he did write the editorial and that 
therefore he had no defense in the Alabama trial court. 
In Mercantile National Bank v. Lan~u, 371 U.S. 555, ,..... 
9 L.Ed. 2d 523, 83 S.Ct. 520, "finality" was established because 
there was involved: 
"A separate and independent matter, anterior 
to the merits and not enmeshed in the factual 
and legal issues comprising the Plaintiff's 
cause of action." 
If THE MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING COMPANY will concede 
that it has nothing more Lo present to the trial court and that 
-3-
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as a practical matter, the judgment is final against it on all 
issues that if it loses this appeal, it must publish the replies 
and/or be liable for such damages as may be proved -- this threshold 
difficulty to both jurisdiction and the granting of a stay, may be 
obviated. Unfortunately, and we invite a statement from the Appellant 
to the contrary, THE MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING COMPANY seeks to assert 
that the Florida Supreme Court order was "final" while purporting to 
preserve independent and factual defenses for its forthcoming trial --
-------
if the decision below should be affirmed. 
But for the nagging question of the finality of the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Florida, the Appellee agrees that 
the matters raised on appeal are of ·such magnitude as to warrant 
full review by the Supreme Court of the United States. The federal 
' 
issues that have been raised and preserved are clearly "substantial". 
With or without a formal stay order, the Appellee will not seek 
further relief from the state courts of Florida pending disposition 
of the present appeal. 
However, a continuation of the Appellant's written 
attitudes to the posture of the case reflect upon the possibility 
that jurisdiction may be declined; and to this extent, may bear 
upon the disposition of Mr. Justice Powell's stay order. Appellee 
will approach the matter in greater detail in our forthcoming 
to the Jurisdictional Statement. We have no other objections to the 
~-------------------------------· 
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JURISDICTIONAL NOT 
STATEMENT MERITS MOTION AB-
~~---r---.--~--~--+--.---+---.--~SENT VOT-
o D N POST DIS AFF REV AFF G D ING 
CERT. 
-~ 
£. PRELIMINARY MEMO 
PO~ Januar,y 11, 1974 .Conference. Y-r' List 1, Sheet 1 · · · 
}\A~}L A ... ,~.-~ ~ N_o_. _7_3-_7_9_7 ______ _ 
y ·~ 
\.0 ~p ~~;\l~J· ~~;.,s~ap~:i:.io1::.\Knight # ~omFlaSC 
-~ v (Carlton, Adkins, McCain, Dekle, 
{AA rr \ J . Rawls, p. c.; Roberts, specially 
/"'' \ TORNILLO concurring; Boyd, dissenting) 
Timely : " 
~t fY' df' State Civil 
~ ~ tui' l. Appellee brought an action in Circuit Court, Dade County 
~~~(Christie) for declaratory and injunctive relief and p~itive damages agamst 
;.vL appellant for appellant's refusal to publish appellee's reply to editorials 
ftJ concerning appelle.e' s candidacy for a seat in the Florida House of Repre-sentatives. The Court dismissed the action, declaring Fla. Stat. 104. 3 8, 
under which the action was brought, unconstitutional as violative of the 
- 2 -
First Amendment and as impermissibly vague. The Fla SC, in a 
per curiam decision (Carlton, Adkins, McCain, Dekle, Rawls, p. c.; 
Roberts, specially concurring; Boyd, dissenting) reversed the lower court, 
holding the statute constitutional, and remanding to the trial court for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with its decision. 
Appellant claims that Fla. Stat. 104.38 is unconstitutional in that it 
violates the First Amendment and requirements of due process. Appellee 
raises a jurisdictional question of finality of the state court judgment. 
" 
- ~ 
2. FACTS: Appellee Tornillo was a candidate for the Democratic 
Party nomination for a seat in the Florida House of Representatives in the 
fall of 1972, when on Sept. 20 and Sept. 29, 1972, appellant published 
·· eci'itori·al~ harsl~.1y 'c'riti'cal ·of app~lle~' s candidacy. Appellant termed a strike 
,· '' • • • ' t' I • 
which appellee led as an illegal act, and termed the election of appellee as 
/ 
"inexcusable." App. 45. Appellant stated that appellee had for years "been 
kicking the public shin to call attention to his shakedown statesmanship •• 
Give him public office, says Pat [appellee, Pat L. Tornillo, Jr. ], and he 
- ~ 
will no doubt live by the Golden Rule. Our translation reads that as m 'ore gold 
and more rule." App. 4 7. 
Appellee demanded that appellant print verbatim his replies to the, two 
editorials. Appellant refused and appellee filed a civil complaint seeking 
injunctive relief and punitive damages. (The Fla SC and appellee also state 
that appellee sought declaratory relief.) 
- 3 -
Fla. St~04. 38 reads as follows: 
-----
§ 104.38 Newspaper assailing candidate for 
election; space for reply. -- If any newspaper in its 
columns a;sails the personal character of any candi-
date for nomination or for election in' any election, 
or charges said candidate with malfeasance or mis-
feasance in office, or otherwise attacks his official 
record, or gives to another free space for such 
purpose, s_~ch newspaper f?hall u on re uest~ sue~ 
candidate immediate y publish free of c~t any rep!y 
he mayrnake thereto in as conspicuous a place and in 
the same kind of type as the matter that calls for such 
reply, provided such reply does not take up more 
space than the matter replied to. Any person or firm 
failing to comply with the provisions of this section 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, 
punishable as provided in § 775. 082 or § 775. 083. 
A candidate "shall mean an:Y person who has filed his qualification papers, 
· ·, ~.nd paid his qualifying fees as req'lfired by law." Fla. Stat. 97. 021{18). 
J-. -.t:',,, ~. J- , , · t . • . \. .· . ' ,• • ' ··· I.: "' • I 
This statute, passed in largely the sam:e· form as ·it exists now in · 
--1913, was held constitutional by the Fla SC as a means to increase the flow 
. ' 
of information to make a more and better informed electorate. The SC noted 
the increasing concentration of the ownership of the mass media into fewer 
and fewer hands, which fact jeopardizes the ability of the public to make " 
enlightened choices concerning public controversies. The SC relied heavily 
in ~ecision on Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C.~ 395 U.S. 367 {1969), 
and stated that it could take into consideration the principles enunciated 
therein since "dissemination of news other than purely local is transmitted 
over telegraph wires or over air waves." App. 18. The SC held the statute 
not vague or overbroad, and restricted "any reply," to one that is wholly 




slanderous, vulgar or profane. App. 16. Contrary to the impression of 
appellant, J. S., p. 8, the Fla SC did not, it appears, approve, at least in -------- - -
the instant case, the appropriateness of an injunction issuing under 104. 38: --
::J1: 
Neither appellant nor appellee takes issue with the 
holding of the trial court that it lacked jurisdiction to 
enjoin an alleged violation of Florida Statute 104. 38. 
J 
This provision is criminal in nature and absent special 
circumstances equity will usually not enjoin commission 
of a crime. (App. 13) (footnote omitted) -----The Fla SC also seems to have attempted to restrict its holding as to the 
constitutionality of the statute to whatever civil remedies .may be possible 
thereunder, although this is unclear. In its opinion on the petn for rehearing, 
the Fla SC (per curiam, with Boyd dissenting without opinion) stated that since 
~:.: l(o' ·crifl1:inal penalty. was being imposed, its validity vel non "is not here 
. ...... ~ J . ' . ' . . . . ' . - . ' . .. . . ' 
involved. II App. 26. Yet the sc· hnrriediately ther,eafter defends the constitu-
"'tionality of the statute in its entirety, and, at App. 27, states (by negative 
implication) as a finding of the SC that the statute is "sufficiently definite and 
. . 
specific to support a criminal penalty.'' 
3. CONTENTIONS: 
- , 
(a) Appellant contends that the issue of the constitutionality of 'this 
statute is important and novel. The statute violates appellant's First 
Amendment rights. Compelling a newspaper to publish that which it would 
ot~erwise not print is as much of an unconstitutional fetter on press freedom 
under the First Amendment as any prohibition as to what the paper can print. 
Appellant relies principally on Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic 
National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973). Red Lion Broadcasting v. F.C.C. , 







Appellee agrees that the First Amendment issues here present 
significant federal questions: does the right of reply statute implement or 
impede the effectuation of freedom of speech? Appellee's position is that 
right of reply statutes advance the cause of free speech. Appellee further 
asserts that any incidental infringement on freedom of speech by Florida's · 
right of reply statute is outweighed by the state's exercise of its police power 
to aid ·political expression and insure the integrity of the electoral process. 
(b) Appellant claims that the statute is vague and ambiguous, and 
" 
so fails to properly inform persons of those acts which might be held 
illegal under the enactment. 
Appellee disagrees. The Fla SC has adequately defined the statute 
in its opinions in this case. · . 4t any rate, criminal penalties are not herein 
involved, and the Fla SC has indicated that the criminal penalty is a severable 
part of the statute. 
(c) Appellant contends that 
the opinion and judgment of the Florida Supreme Court 
are final for purposes of 28 U.S. C. § 1257(2). The 
Florida Supreme Gourt conclusively decided the 
controlling constitutional issue, and its decision, 
which is binding upon the trial court, is therefore 
reviewable by this Court •••• (J. S., p. 3, cases 
omitted. ) 
Appellee, relying principally on Mills v. Alabama, 3 84 U.S. 214 (196 5 ), 
contends that the decision is final only if statutory construction and factual 
defenses which might be asserted by appellant on remand are conceded. 






for the further proceedings to be had in state trial court. While in Mills, 
appellant conceded that the only defense he had was a constitutional one, 
appellant here appears to reserve a variety of nonconstitutional defenses. 
"Appellee believe s that it is necessary for Appellant to make a further 
statement on the question of whether they [sic] are res erving a variety 
of independent defenses of a factual and statutory construction nature." 
Response, p. 7. Appellee apparently believes that injunctive relief is still 
available in the case. Ibid. 
(d) Amici have filed eight briefs in support of the jurisdictional 
----- ----statement, all basically tracking the arguments set out by appellant. Amici ·---are Dow Jones & Co., New York Times Co., New York News, Inc., American 
Newspa per Publishers. As·soc., . T~mes Mirror Co., American Civil Liberties 
I ' . . . • 
Union, ACLU of Florida, Washingt4n Post Co., Reporters Committee~r 
Freedom of the Press Legal Defense and Research Fund, Art Buchwald, 
Horance G. Davis, Jr., James J. Kilpatrick, Anthony Lewis, Robert D. 
"------1 
Novak, Carl T. Rowan, Hugh Sidey, Thomas G. Wicker, Jules J. Whitcover, 
Chicago Tribune Company, Gore Newspapers Company, and Sentinel Star 
Company. 
4. DISCUSSION: Many of the opinions in CBS v. DNC have language 
critical of such regulation as is here under attack. See, 412 U.S., at 117-
118 (Opinion of Burger, C. J. ); 144-145 (Stewart, J., concurring); 150-153 
(Douglas, J., concurring in judgment); 182 n. 12 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
But, see Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 47 n. 15 (Gpinion of 
- 7 -
Brennan, J. ). The First Amendment issues presented by this case appear 
to be of importance. 
The jurisdictional problem does seem to be a significant barrier to the 
noting o! thi~ _case at the present time. Appellant has not conceded his 
non-constitutional defenses on remand, and if this Court were to rule that the 
Fla statute was constitutional, there is nothing now to prevent appellant from 
returning to the Fla courts and defeating appellee's action on the non-
constitutional merits of the case. Appellee appears to be mistaken, though, 
in assuming that appellant's concessions would require appellant to print 
appellee's reply or replies. Injunctive relief appears to have been ruled out 
in this case by the Fla SC. See, SJ..Ipra. Appellant would probably have to 
concede liability for punitive damages. Even then the judgment would not be 
--final unless the appellant and appellee agreed as to the amount of damages 
which would be due. "[T]he requirement of finality has not been met 
merely because the major issues in a case have been decided and only a few 
- , 
loose ends remain to be tied up -- for example, where liability has been 
determined and all that needs to be adjudicated is the amount of damages." 
Republic Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 68 (1948). Appellee has 
provided no indication of willingness to settle on a figure of damages for 
purposes of allowing appellant to claim jurisdiction in this Court. It seems 
highly unlikely that the parties could stipulate punitive damages or that this 
Court c_ould devise procedures for causing such to happen. Appellee apparently 
believes that he is not required to take any steps for jurisdiction to obtain. 
0 '-
' - -
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Justice Powell ,/ 
Juetioe Rehnquist 
2nd DRAFT' From: The ChieL Justlce 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED ST!~ES-ated: ___ _ 
Recirculated: JUN 5 1974 
No. 73-797 
The Miami Herald Publishing 
Company, A Division of 
Knight Newspapers, 
Inc., Appellant, 
On Appeal from the Su-
preme Court of Florida. 
v. 
Pat L. Tornillo, Jr. 
[June -, 1974] 
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of 
the Court. 
The issue in this case 1s whether a state statute grant· 
ing a political candidate a right to equal space to reply to 
criticism and attacks on his record by a newspaper, vio-
lates the guarantees of a free press. 
I 
In the fall of 1972. appellee, Executive Director of the 
Classroom Teachers Association, apparently a teachers' 
collective-bargaining agent, was a candidate for the 
Florida House of Representatives. On September 20, 
1972, and again on September 29, 1972, appellant printed 
editorials harshly critical of appellee's candidacy.1 In 
1 The text of thf' September 20, 1972, editorial i::; as follow::; : 
"The State's Laws And Pat Tornillo 
"LOOK who '::; upholding the law! 
' 'Pat Tornillo, boss of the C!as::;room Teachers Association an<l 
candidate for the State LPglslature in the Oct . 3 runoff election, has 
clenouncect hi;; opponcut as lacking 'the knowledge to be a legislator, 
73-797-0PINION 
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response to these editorials appellee demanded that 
appellant print verbatim his replies, defending the role 
of the Classroom Teachers Association and the organiza-
tion's accomplishments for the citizens of Dade County. 
Appellant declined to print the appellee's replies, and 
appellee brought suit in Circuit Court, Dade County, 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and actual and 
punitive damages in excess of $5,000. The action was 
as evidenced by his failure to file a list of contributions to and ex-
penditures of lm campaign as rcqmred by law.' 
"Czar Tornillo calls 'vwlatwn of thiS law inexcusable.' 
"Tins is the same Pat Tornillo who led the CTA strike from 
February 19 to March 11, 1968, against the school children and tax-
payers of Dade County. Call it whatever you will, it was an illegal 
act again~t the public mtrrest and clearly prohibited by the statutes. 
"We cannot say it would be illegal but certainly it would be in-
excusable of thr voters if tlwy sent Pat Tornillo to Tallahassee to 
occupy the scat for Di~trirt 103 in the House of Representatives." 
The text of the September 29, 1972, editorial is as follows: 
"FROM the people who brought you this-the teacher strike of 
'68--come now mstructionR on how to vote for responsible govern-
ment, 1.e., agam:;t Crutcher Harrison and Ethel Beckham, for Pat 
Tornillo. The tracts and blurbs and bumper stickers pile up daily in 
teachers' school mailboxeH amid~t continuing pouts that the School 
Board should be delivering all tins at your expense. The screeds 
say the strike I<' not an 1s~ue. We say maybe it wouldn't be were it 
not a part of a contmuat10n of disregard of any and all laws the 
CTA m1ght find aggravatmg. Whether in defiance of zoning laws 
at CTA Towers, contractH and laws during the st rike, or more re-
cently statr prohibitions agamst soliciting campaign funds amongst 
teachers, CTA sty:; fie and try and sue us-what's good for CTA is 
good for CTA and that ~~natural law. Tornillo's law, maybe. For 
years now hr ha~; bren kicking the public shin to call attention to his 
shakedown statrsmanship. He and whichrver acerbic prexy is in 
allrged officr havr alwayH frlt the1r private ventures so chock-full of 
pubhe weal that we shonld leap at the chance to nab the tab, be it 
half the GlonouH Leader's ;:alary or the dues checkoff or anything 
else except perhaps mileage on the ~;taff hydrofoil. Give him public 
office, ~ays Pat, and he will no doubt live by the Golden Rule. Our 
translation read~J that a,_. more gold and more rule." 
73-797-0PINION 
MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING CO. ii. TORNILLO 3 
premised on Florida Statute § 104.38, a "right of reply" 
statute which provides that if a candidate for nomina-
tion or election is assailed regarding his pers6'nal characte't 
oT official record by any newspaper, the cantlidt:tte has th~ 
right to demand that the newspaper print, fre~ of cost to 
the candidate. any reply the candidate may make to the 
newspaper's charges. The reply must appear in as con• 
spicuous a place and in the same kind of type as the 
,charges which prompted the reply, provided it does not 
take up more space than the charges. Failure to comply 
with the statute constitutes a first-degree misdeameanor. 2 
Appellant sought a declaration that § 104.38 was 
unconstitutional. After an emergency hearing requested 
by appellee, the Circuit Court denied injunctive relief 
because, absent special circumstances, no injunction will 
lie against the comrnission of a crime, and that § 104.38 
was unconstitutional as an infringement on the freedom 
of the press as protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution. Tornillo v . .Miami 
Herald Publishing Co., 38 Fla. Supp. 80 (1972). The 
Circuit Court concluded that dictating what a newspaper 
must print was no different from dictating what it must 
not print. The Circuit Judge viewed the statute's vague-
ness as serving "to restrict and stifle protected expres-
2 "104.:38 N eu•spaper assa!lmg candtdate m an election,· space for 
reply-If any newspaper in 1ts columns a::;::;ails the personal charac~ 
tor of any candidate for nommation or for election in any election, or 
charges ~a1d candidate with malfea::;anre or mi~feasance in office, or 
otherWl::;e attacks hi::; official record, or gives to another free space 
for ~uch purpo~e, ::;urh newspaper shall upon request of such candi-
datr Immediately publish frrr of cost any rE'ply h!c' may make thereto 
in as conspicuous a placr and in the same kind of type as the matter 
that calls for :>urh reply, provJdlc'd such r!c'ply doE's not take up more 
;;parr than the matter r£>plied to . Any pcrt;on or firm failing to 
comply w1th thE' provision;; of tlu:; ::;cctJOn ~hall br guilty of a mis-
demeanor of th£> fir::;t ckgrf'e, puni::;habl(' a::; prov1ded in § 775,082 or 
§ 77fi ,80~ ." 
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sion.'" 38 Fla. Supp., at 83. Appellee's cause was dis-
missed with prejudice. 
On direct appeal, the Florida Supreme Court reversed 
holding that t..lole Gil ettit c~HiPt ttna l:!elft. ~ 104.38 did not 
viOlate constitutional guarantees. Tornillo v. Miami 
Herald Publishing Co., 287 So. 2d 78 (1973).~ It held 
that free speech was enhanced and not abridged by the 
Florida right of reply statute, which in that court's view. 
furthered the "broad societal interest in the free flow of in-
formation to the public.'' 287 So. 2d, at 82. It also held 
that the statute was not impermissably vague; the 
statute informs "those who are subject to it as to what 
conduct on their part will render them liable to its penal-
ties.'' 287 So. 2d, at 85. 1 Civil remedies. including 
damages, were held to be available under this statute; the 
case was remanded to the trial court for further proceed-
iugs not inconsistent with the Florida Supreme Cour-t's 
conclusions. 
We postponed decision on jurisdiction pending con-
·fuderation of the merits. F B. - (1974). 
IT 
Although both parties contend that this Court has 
jurisdiction to review the ,iUdgment of the Florida 
:I The Supreme Court did not du.;turb tiH' Circuit ·Court 's holding 
that mjunctivf> relief waH not proper m tim; ca~ evE>n if the :;tatute 
WE're con:;ttt utional. Accordmg to the Supreme Court neither side 
took is:-;ue with that part of the Circmt Court's decisfon. 287-So. 2c1; 
at 85 
4 The Supr<.'me Court placed the foltowmg lunitmg construction on 
the ~tatute , 
" [ WJe hold that the mandate of the Htatute refers to 'nny reply' 
which Is who1ly re:;ponHive to the charge made in the echtorial or 
other article m a new~paper hem~ repliE'd to and further that such 
reply Will be neither hbelou~ nor slandE'rous of the publieation nor 
anyone else, nor vulgar nor profatl(l " 
287-So 2d. at 86 
·. 
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Supreme Court, a suggestion was initially made that the 
judgment of the Florida Supreme Court roight not be 
"final" under 28 U. S. C. § 1257.5 . In North Dakota 
State Board of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, -
U. S.- (1973), we reviewed a judgment of the North 
Dakota Supreme Court, under which the case had been 
remanded so that further state proceedings could be 
conducted respecting Snyder's application for a permit 
to operate a drug store. We held that to be a final 
judgment for purposes of our jurisdiction. Under the 
principles of finality enunciated in Snyder's Drug Stores, 
the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court in this case 
is ripe for review by this Court,6 
III 
A 
The challenged statute creates a right to reply to press 
criticism for a candidate for nomination or election. The 
statute was enacted in 1913 and this is only the second 
:recorded case decided under its provisions.1 
r; Appellee'~ Re~pon::;e to Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement all(l 
Motion to Affirm the Judgment Below or, in the Alternative, to Dis-
miss the Appeal, at 4-7 , 
6 Both appellant and appellee rlaim that the uncertainty of the 
constitutional validity of § 104.38 restricts the present exercise of 
First Amendment rights . Brief for Appellant, at 41. Brief for Ap-
pellee, at, 79. Appellant finds urgency for the present consideration 
of the constitutionality of the statute in the upcoming 1974 elections. 
Whichever way we were to decide on the merits, it would be in-
tolerable to leave unan::;wered, under these circumstances, an jm., 
portant question of freedom of the press under the First Amendment; 
an uneasy and un~>ettled eonstitutional posture of § 104.38 could only 
further harm the operation of a free press. Mills v. Alabama, 3&l 
U. R 214, 221-222 (1966) (DouGLAS, J., concurring), See also Or-
ganization for a Better A-ustin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415, 418 n. (1971). 
1 In its first court te:>t the statute was declared unconstitutional,. 
State v. News-Journal, 36 Fla. Supp .. 164 (Volusia County J . Ct., Fla. 
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Appellant contends the statute is void on its face 
because it purports to regulate the content of a news-
paper in violation of the First Amendment. Alterna· 
tively it is urged that the statute is void for vagueness 
since no editor could know exactly what words would call 
the statute into operation. It is also contended that the 
statute fails to distinguish between critical comment 
which is and is not defamatory. 
B 
The appellee and supporting advocates of an enforce-
able right of access to the press vigorously argue that 
Government has an obligation to ensure that a wide 
variety of views reach the public.H The contentions of 
access proponents will be set out in some detail.0 , It is 
urged that at the time the First Amendment to the 
Constitution 10 was enacted in 1791 as part of our Bill 
of Rights the press was broadly representative of the 
people it was serving. While many of the newspapers 
were intensely partisan and narrow in their views, the 
press collectively presented a broad range of opinions to 
readers. Entry into publishing was inexpensive; pam-
phlets and books provided meaningful alternatives to the 
1972) . In neither of th!:' two :;uJt~, the mstunt act10n and the 1972 
action, has the Florida Attorney General defended the statute's 
constitutionality 
8 S!:'e generally Barron, Acerss to the Press-A New Fir:;t Amend-
m!:'nt Right, RO Harv. L. Rev. 1()41 (1967). 
u For a good overview of the po;;ition of acc!:'Hii advocates see Lange, 
the Role of the A(WSE; Doctrinr in the Regulation of the Mass Media: 
A Critical Review and Asses;;ment, 52 N. Car. L. Rev. 1, 8-9 (1973) 
(herrinafter "Lange") 
10 "Congre~s shall make no law respectmg an establishment of 
religiOn, or prohibiting the freP exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the pr!:'~;;; or of the right of the people 
p!:'aceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress 
of grievances! ' 
7S-797 -OPINION 
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organized press for the expression of unpopular ideas and 
often treated events and expressed views not covered by 
conventional newspapers.n A true marketplace of ideas 
existed in which there was relatively easy access to the 
channels of communication. 
Access advocates submit that .although newspapers of 
the present are superficially similar to those of 1791 the 
press of today is in reality very different from that 
known in the early years of our national existence. In 
the past half century a communications revolution has 
seen the introduction of radio and television into our 
lives, the promise of a global community through the 
use of communications satellites, and the spectre of a 
"wired" nation by means of an expanding cable tele-
vision network with two-way capabilities. The printed 
press, it is said, has not escaped the effects of this revolu-
tion. Newspapers have become big business and there 
are far fewer of them to serve a larger literate popula-
tion.'2 Chains of newspapers, national newspapers, 
national wire and news services, and one-newspaper 
towns/a are the dominant features of a press that has 
become noncompetitive and enormously powerful and 
influential in its capacity to manipulate popular opinion 
and changes the course of events. Major metropolitan 
'
1 SPC CommJsswn on Freedom of the Pres~, A Free and Respon-
Sible Press 14 {1947) {hereinafter "Commission") . 
12 Commission 15. EvC'n in the last 20 years there has been a sig-
nificant increase in the number of people likely to read newspapers. 
B. Bagdikian, Fat Newspapers and Slim Coverage, Columbia Journal-
ISm Review, Sept.jOct. 1973, at 16. 
Ia " Nearly half of U. S. daily newspapers, representing some three-
fifths of daily and Sunday circulation, are owned by newspaper groups 
and chains, including diversified business conglomerates. One news-
paper towns have become the rule, with effective competition operat-
ing m only 4 percent of our large cities." A Balk, Background 
Paper, TwC'ntieth Century Fund Ta~k Force Report for a National 
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newspapers have collaborated to establish news services 
national in scope.11 Such national news organizations 
provide syndicated "interpretative reporting" as well a. 
syndicated features and commentary, all of which can 
serve as part of the new school of "advocacy journalism." 
The elimination of competing newspapers in moat of 
our large cities, and the concentration of control of media 
that results from the only newspaper being owned by the 
same interests which own a televisi011 station and a radio 
station, are important components of this trend toward 
concentration of control of outlets to inform the public. 
The result of these vast changes has been to place in 
a few hands the power to inform the American people 
and shape public opinion. 1" Much of the editorial 
opinion and commentary that is printed is that of syndi-
cated columnists distributed nationwide and, as a result, 
. I 
we are told, on national and world issues there tends to 
be a homogeneity of editorial opinion, commentary, and 
interpretative analysis. The abuses of bias and manipu-
lative reportage are, likewise, said to be the result of the 
vast accumulations of unreviewable power in the modern 
media empires. In effect, it is claimed, the public has 
lost any ability to respond or to contribute in a meaning-
ful way to the debate on issues. The monopoly of the 
means of communication allows for little or no critical 
14 Report of the Task Forcr, Twentieth Century Fund Task Force 
Report for a Nat10nal News Council, A Free and Responsive Press 
4 (1973) 
1 " ''Local monopoly m printed news rmse;; serious questions of 
diversity of mformation and opm10n. What a local newspaper does 
not print about local affair::; doPs not see general print at all. And 
havmg the power to take initiative m rcportmg and enunciation of 
opinions, it ha::; extraordinary power to ::;et the atmo~phere and deter-
minr thr trrm::; of local con::;idrration of public i::;surs." B. Bagdikian, 
The lJ}formatlon Machmc~ 127 (1971) . 
.. 
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n.nalysis of the media except in professional journals of 
very limited readership. 
"This concentration-of-nationwide news organiza-
tions-like other large institutions-has grown in-
creasingly remote from and unresponsive to the 
popular constituencies on which they depend and 
which depend on them." Report of the Task Force, 
The Twentieth Century Fund Task Force Report 
for a National News Council, A Free and Responsive 
Press. at 4 (1973) , 
Appellees cite the report of the Commission on Freedom 
of the Press, chaired by Robert M. Hutchins, in which 
it was stated, as long ago as 1947, that "The right of free 
public expression has . .. lost its earlier reality." Com-
mission on Freedom of the Press. A Free and Respon-
sible Press 15, 
The obvious solution, which was available to dissidents 
at an earlier time when entry into publishing was rela-
tively inexpensive, today would be to have additional 
newspapers. But the same economic factors which have 
caused the disappearance of vast numbers. af metropolitan 
newspapers/!; have made entry into the marketplace of 
ideas served by the print media almost impossible, It is 
urged that the claim of newspapers to be "surrogates for 
the public" carries with it a concomitant fiduciary obliga-
tion to account for that stewardship.17 From this premise 
16 The newspapers have persuaded Congress to grant them im-
munity from the antitrust Jaws in the case of "failing" newspapers 
for joint operations. 15 U. S. C. § 1801 et seq. 
1 7 "Freedom of the press i;; a right belonging, like all rights in a 
democracy, to all the people. As a practical matter, however, it can 
be exerc1sed only by those who have effective access to the press. 
Where the financial, econom1c and technological conditions limit such 
access to a small minority, the exercise of that right by that minority 
takes on fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary characteristics." A. MacLeish 
ju W. Hocking, Freedom of the Pree!:l, at 99 n. 4 (1947) . 
73-797-0PINION 
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it is reasoned that the only effective way out of this 
dilemma and to provide for some accountability and for 
accuracy is for government to take affirmativce action. 
The First Amendment right of the public to be informed 
is said to be in peril; the "marketplace of ideas" is today 
a monopoly co11trolled by the owners of the market. 
Proponents of guaranteed access to the press take com-
fort from language in several of this Court's decisions, 
language which suggests that the First Amendment acts 
as a sword as well as a shield, ~h1:1-t it imposes obligations 
on the owners of the press in addition to protecting the 
press from government regulation. In Associated Press 
v. United States, 326 U. S. 1, 20 (1945), .the Court, in 
rejecting the argument that the press is immune from 
the antitrust laws by virtue of the First Amendment, 
stated : 
"The First Amendment, far from providing an argu-
ment against application of the Sherman Act, here 
provides powerful reasons to the contrary. That 
amendment rests on the assumption that the widest 
possible dissemination of information from diverse 
and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare 
of the public, that a free press is a condition of a 
free society. Surely a command that the govern-
ment itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas 
does not afford non-governmental combinations a 
refuge if they impose restraints upon that constitu-
tionally guaranteed freedom. Freedom to publish 
means freedom for all and not for some. Freedom 
to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but 
freedom to combine to keep others from publishing 
is not. Freedom of the press from governmental 
intederence under the First Amendment does not 
sanction repression of that freedom by private inter .. 
ests." (Footnote omitted.) 
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In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 
(1964), the Court spoke of "a profound national commit-
ment to the principle that debate on public issues should 
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." It is argued 
that the "uninhibited, robust'' debate is not "wide-open" 
but open only to a monopoly in control of the press. 
Appellee cites the plura.lity opinion in Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 47 & n. 15 (1971), which 
he suggests seemed to invite experimentation by the 
States in right to access regulation of the press.18 
Access advocates note that Mn. JuSTICE DouGLAS a 
decade ago expressed his deep concern regarding the 
effects of newspaper monopolies: 
"Where one paper has a monopoly in an area, it 
seldom presents two sides of an issue. It too often 
hammers away on one ideological or political line 
18 "If the Stateo; fear that private citizens will not be able to re-
spond adequately to publicity involving them, the solution lies in the 
direction of ensuring their ability to respond, rather than in stifling 
public discussion of matters of public concern.16 • •• 
" 16 Some states have adopted retraction statutes or right-of-reply 
statutes ••• 
"One writer, m arguing that the First Amendment itself should be 
read to guarantee a right of access to the media not limited to a 
right to respond to defamatory falsehoods, has suggested several ways 
the law might encourage public discussion. Barron, Acces!l to the 
Press-A New First Amendment right, 80 Harv, L. Rev. 1641, 1666-
1678 (1967). It is important to recognize that the private individual 
often desires press exposure rither for himself, his ideas, or his 
causes. Constitutional adiudi'ciation must take into account the 
individual's interest in acceRs to the press as well as the individual's 
interest in preserving his reputation, even though libel actions by 
their nature encourage a narrow view of the individual's interest 
since they focus only on situation& where the individual has been 
harmed by undesired press attention. A constitutional rule that 
deters the press from covering the ideas or activities 'of the private 
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using its monopoly position not to educate people, 
not to promote debate, but to inculcate its readers 
with one philosophy, one attitude-and to make 
money . . . . The newspapers that give a variety of 
views and news that is not slanted or contrived are 
few indeed. And the problem promises to get 
worse ... /' The Great Right (Ed. by E. Cahn), 
at 124-125, 127 (1963) . 
They also claim the qualified support of Professor 
Thomas I. Emerson, who has written that "[a] limited 
right of access to the press can be safely enforced," 
although he believes that "[g) overnment measures to 
encourage a multiplicity of outlets, rather than com-
pelling a few outlets to represent everybQdy, seems a 
preferable cours<:> of action." T. Emerson, The System 
of Freedom of Expression 671 (1970)/u · 
IV 
However much validity may be found in these argu-
ments, at each point the implementation of a remedy 
such as an enforceable right of access necessarily calls for 
some mechanisin, ·either governmental or consenual.20 
If it is governmental coercion, this at once brings about 
a confrontation with the express provision:s of the First 
10 Professor Emero;on would apparently con:sider regulation of the 
nature of § 104.a8 to be constitutionally enforceable~ lc/., at 670-67L 
20 The National New:; Council, an independent and voluntary 
body concerned with prPss fairneo;s, was crPated in 19?3 following 
the publication of the TwentiPth Century Fund's Task Force Report 
for a National New:; Council, A Free and Hco;ponsive Press. The 
Background Paper attached to the Heport dealt in some detail with 
the British Press Council, seen by the author of the paper as having, 
of the pre~:; council;; ~n Euro\)C, tho most interest to the Uniteq 
State .• 
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Amendment and the judicial gloss on that amendment 
developed over the years. 2 l 
The Court foresaw the problerns relating to govern-
ment enforced access as early as its decision in Associated 
Press v. United States, supra, 326 U. S., at 20 n. 18. 
There it carefully contrasted the private "compulsion to 
print" callerl for by the Association's Bylaws with the 
provisions of the District Court decree against appellants 
which "does not compel AP or its members to permit 
publication of anything which their 'reason' tells them 
should not be published." In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 
U. S. 665, 681 ( 1972), we emphasized that the cases then 
befor£> us "involve no intrusions upon speech and as· 
sembly, no prior restraint or restriction on what the press 
may publish, and no express or implied command that 
the press publish what it prefers to withhold." In Co-
lumbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National 
Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 117 ( 1973), the plurality opinion 
observ£>d . 
"The power of a privately owned newspaper to 
advance its own political, social, and economic views 
is bounded by only two factors: first, the acceptance 
of a sufficient number of readers-and hence adver-
tisers-to assure financial success; and, second, the 
journalistic integrity of its editors and publishers." 
An attitude strongly adverse to any attempt to extend 
a nght of access to newspapers was echoed by several 
Members of this Court in their separate opinions in that 
case. 412 U. S .. at 145 ( S'I'EWART. J., concurring); 412 
U. S., at 182 n. 12 (BRENNAN, J .. dissenting). H.ecently, 
while approvmg a bar against employment advertising 
H Berau;;e we hold that § 104.;38 vwl~te::; the First Amendment's 
guarantee of a free pre~s we have no occa;;wn to consider appellant's 
further argument that thr .~tatute IS lmcon:>tJtutionally vague. 
,, 
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specifying "male" or "female'' preference, the Court's 
opinion in Pittsburg Press Co. v. Human Relations Com-
mission, supra, 413 U. S., at 391, took pains to limit its 
holding within narrow bounds : 
"Nor, a fortiori, does our decision authorize any 
restriction whatever, whether of content ·.or layout, 
on stories or commentary o~iginated by Pittsburgh 
Press, its columnists, or its contributors. On the 
contrary, we reaffirm unequivocally the protection 
afforded to editorial judgment and to the free expres-
sion of views on these and other issues, however 
controversial." 
Dissenting in Pittsburgh Press, MR. JusTCE STEWART 
joined by MR. JusTICE DouGLAS expressed the view that 
no "government agency-local, state, or federal-can tell 
a newspaper in advance what it can print and what it 
cannot." !d., at 400. See Associates & Aldrich Com-
pany v. Times Mirror Company, 440 F. 2d 133, 135 (CA9 
1971) . 
We see that beginning with Associated Press, supra, the 
Court has expressed sensitivity as to whether a restriction 
or requirement constituted the compulsion exerted by 
government on a newspaper to print that which it would 
not otherwise print. The clear implication has been that 
any such a compulsion to publish that which " 'reason' 
tells them should not be published" is unconstitutional. 
A responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but 
press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution 
and like many other virtues it cannot be legislated. 
Appellee's argument that the Florida statute does not 
amount to a restriction of appellant's right to speak 
because "the statute in question here has not prevented 
the Miami Herald from saying anything it wished" 22 
begs the core question. Compelling editors or publishers 
2 2 Brief for Appellee, at 5. 
.. 
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to publish that "which 'reason' tells them should not be 
published" is what is at issue in this case. The Florida 
statute operates as a command in the same sense as a 
statute or regulation forbidding appellant from publish-
ing specified matter. Governmental restraint on pub .. 
lishing need not fall into familiar or traditional patterns 
to be subject to constitutional limitations on governmen-
tal powers. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 
233, 244-245 (1936). The Florida statute exacts a 
penalty on the basis of the content of a newspaper. The 
first phase of the penalty of the compelled printing of a 
reply is exacted in terms of the cost in printing and com· 
posing time and materials and in taking up space that 
could be devoted to other material the newspaper may 
have preferred to print. It is correct, as appellee/ 
contends, that a newspaper is not subject to the finite 
technological limitations of time that confront a broad-
caster but it is not correct to say that, as an economic 
reality, a newspaper can proceed to infinite expansion of 
its column space to accommodate the replies that a gov~ 
ernment agency determines the readers should have 
available.23 
Appellant argues that, faced with the severe penalties 
that would accrue to any newspaper that published news 
2a "However, since the amount of space a newspaper can devote to 
'live news' is finite, 30 if a newspaper is forced to publish a particular 
item, it must as a practical matter, omit something else. 
" 39 The number of column inches available for news is predeter-
mined by a number of financial and physical factors, including circ-
ulation, the amount of advertising, and, increasingly, the availability 
of newsprmt. . ." 
Note, 48 Tulane L. Rev. 438,438 (1974) (footnote omitted). 
Another factor operating against the "solution" of adding more 
pages to accommodate the access matter is that "increasingly sub-
scribers complain of bulky, unwieldly papers." Bagdikian, Fat Newffw 
papers and Slim Coverage, Co!umbia Journalism Review, Sept.jOct. 
1973, at 19. 
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or commentary arguably within the reach of the right of 
access statute, editors might well conclude that the safe 
course is to avoid controversy and that, under the opera• 
tion of the Florida statute, political and electoral coverage 
would be blunted or reduced. 24 Government enforced 
right of access, appellant argues, inescapably "dampens 
the vigor and limits the variety of public debate," New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U. S., at 279. 
Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs 
to comply with a compulsory access law and would not be 
forced to to forego publication of news or opinion by the 
inclusion of a reply, the Florida statute fails to clear the 
barriers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion 
into the function of editors. A newspaper is more than 
a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and 
advertising.2~ The choice of material to go into a news-
paper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the 
size of the paper, and content, and treatment of public 
issues and public officials-whether fairly or unfairly 
done-constitutes the exercise of editorial control and 
judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how govern-
mental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised 
consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free 
press as they have evolved to this time. Accordingly, the 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
24 See the description of the likely effect of the Florida statute on 
publishers, in Lange, 52 N. C. L. Rev., at 70-71. 
2 ~ "[L]iberty of the press is in peril as soon as the government tries 
to compel what is to go into a newspaper. A journal does not merely 
print observed facts the way a cow is photographed through a plate-
glass window. As soon as the facts are set in their context, you have 
interpretation and you have selection, and editorial selection opens 
the way to editorial suppression. Then how can the state force 
abstention from discrimination in the news without dictating selec-
tion?" 2 Z. Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 633 
(1947) . 
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